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As Chernenko moved to take control, Kremlinologists set about the task of unraveling the mystery surrounding the new leader's rise to power. A Western envoy concluded that Chernenko's acceptance speech was almost three times as long as Andropov's because he had to please more factions. Many Soviet experts viewed the delay in announcing a new leader as an indication of serious divisions within the Politburo. But in fact there was no concrete information about what took place between Andropov's death and the announcement of Chernenko's elevation.
With the benefit of hindsight, many experts concluded that Chernenko's election was predictable. For months his name had appeared near the top of the lists of dignitaries who signed official obituaries. Chernenko's collected writings and speeches were reprinted amid glowing reviews in the press. When workers nominated their candidates for next month's elections to the Supreme Soviet, the nominal parliament, Chernenko along with Premier Nikolai Tikhonov, 78, consistently placed second, after Andropov. The selection of Chernenko as chairman of the funeral committee was the final hint.
But how had Chernenko staged his political comeback? According to speculation at the time of Andropov's election, Chernenko had been passed over because of his close ties to the Brezhnev bureaucracy. According to this theory, the party apparatus, and hence Chernenko, had lost out when Defense Minister Ustinov tipped the balance in support of Andropov, who had been head of the KGB for 15 years and shared the military's concern for discipline and efficiency. The actual explanation may have been far simpler. Andropov's colleagues on the Politburo apparently considered him to be the more qualified of the two. But once Andropov's health began to fail, Ustinov, Tikhonov and Gromyko evidently decided to line up behind Chernenko rather than throw their support to a younger contender whom they considered too inexperienced for the job. It was Tikhonov who eventually nominated Chernenko in the closed Central Committee meeting.
Chernenko may be well suited to serve as chairman of the board in what could prove to be the most collective Soviet leadership since the first years of the Brezhnev era. A major test of his personal power will come when the Politburo decides who will assume two other posts left vacant after Andropov's death: the largely ceremonial position of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, in effect President, and Chairman of the Defense Council, a shadowy group that oversees national security policy (see chart). If Chernenko fails to be named to either post, he may prove to be little more than a caretaker.
Just as Andropov promoted several of his own men into the party machinery, Chernenko could use his power of appointment to consolidate control. But he too may run out of time. For the second time, the Politburo has postponed handing authority to the younger generation, represented by Geidar Aliyev, 60, Mikhail Gorbachev, 52, Grigori Romanov, 61 and Vitali Vorotnikov, 58. One of Chernenko's most pressing tasks will be to find ways of moving men like these into positions of power without threatening the old guard. One possibility is to give one of the "youths" the job of Premier, now held by Tikhonov.