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Billy's receptiveness to an offer of a free foreign trip was not surprising, since his lavish-spending, heavy-drinking life was turning sour. He had moved to Buena Vista, Ga., spent some $300,000 on a new house, installed an expensive softball field in Plains, but found his income slipping. His venture with "Billy" beer had failed, lucrative speaking invitations were getting scarce, and his stewardship of the family peanut business was under investigation. He had a heavy debt to a lumber company, owed hefty sums to his electrician, carpet and paint suppliers and faced a threatened foreclosure on his house.
If Billy was merely willing to go, the Libyans were eager to have him. Says an Arabic expert in the State Department: "It simply shows a standard Mideast mind-set—the back door to a leader is through his family." Or, as one federal official put it, "The way to reach a king is through his brother." Moreover, Libya had never understood U.S. politics, especially the role of Congress, and had the misguided notion, says a State official, that "a few cocktails and a couple of TV appearances would have an impact on American public opinion—and Billy probably didn't do anything to dissuade them." Actually, says this official, "we've urged their diplomats here to go out and make contacts in the press and on Capitol Hill the way everyone else on Embassy Row does. But, so far, their efforts have been minuscule."
Billy made plans to go to Libya with a longtime Plains pal, Randy Coleman. Before leaving, either Billy or Coleman telephoned Phillip Wise, the President's appointments secretary, to seek a briefing on Libya. Wise relayed the request to the National Security Council, where William Quandt, then chief Middle East specialist on the staff, agreed to talk to Billy and Coleman. This official involvement has already been singled out by the President's critics.
Although such briefings for Americans traveling abroad are not uncommon, they gave Billy the misleading status of being a Washington insider. Billy could have boasted in Libya that he carried an implicit endorsement from the NSC, thus strengthening his credentials as an influence broker. But that is conjecture; whether Billy exploited his briefing is not known.
In his defense, Quandt argues that he tried to persuade Billy to postpone the trip until after the Camp David negotiations. "We were concerned that Gaddafi might attempt to exploit Billy Carter's visit to damage the negotiations," Quandt recalls. While Quandt was trying to explain this to Coleman, Billy grabbed the telephone to declare that he knew more about Libya "than the whole State Department," and he did not need anyone in Washington telling him what to do there. But, as it turned out, Billy did not go until the Camp David talks were over, and indeed, the briefing may have restrained Billy's social exuberance during his week-long stay in Libya. The State Department received reports from its embassy in Tripoli saying that Billy had been "polite and gracious—he was on his best behavior."
It was on this trip that the Libyans asked Billy to help set up a group in the U.S. similar to