A timely get-acquainted mission to Peking
The start of another round of border bloodletting between China and the Soviet Union? It seemed ominous—for a while. As Peking told it, one day last week a Soviet helicopter flew across the Ussuri River frontier and 2½ miles into Heilungkiang, China's easternmost province, while boats landed 30 Soviet troops on Chinese soil. There, Peking charged, the Russians "tried to round up Chinese inhabitants, shooting continually and wounding a number of them." Some captives were dragged back to the river and given "kicks and blows" before they were finally let go.
In a sharp protest, the Chinese accused Moscow of taking "a grave, calculated step" aimed at further worsening relations between the two countries and demanded both a Kremlin apology and punishment of the troops involved. "Otherwise," it added, there would be "consequences." Thereupon Moscow expressed "regrets" and claimed that its border guards "had inadvertently" entered China while "pursuing a dangerous armed criminal."
Only a couple of weeks earlier, Soviet negotiators had arrived in Peking to resume the long-suspended border talks that were begun after the violent frontier clashes between the two hostile Communist leviathans in 1969. But China's tough-talking reaction to last week's incident indicated that Peking-Moscow relations remain very chilly at best. That probably portends a warm welcome in Peking for U.S. National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was due in Peking late this week for a three-day get-acquainted visit; after all, he is the Carter Administration's leading advocate of a hard-line approach to the Soviet Union.
While the status of Sino-Soviet relations will not be explicitly raised by Brzezinski during his trip, China's deep fear of the U.S.S.R. has been a crucial element in the development of closer U.S.-Chinese ties. But the very slow pace of normalizing the links between Washington and Peking has clearly displeased Chinese leaders. One of Brzezinski's main tasks will be to assure China's leaders of the U.S. commitment to closer ties with their country.
Peking would probably prefer complete normalization of Sino-American relations. The main obstacle to this, however, seems to be the Chinese. Their price for full diplomatic ties with Washington is that the U.S. sever its diplomatic and defense links with Taiwan. This the Administration is not likely to consider so long as Peking refuses to pledge that any reunification of Taiwan and the mainland will occur only by peaceful means.
The U.S. backing of Taiwan is not the only complaint Brzezinski will be hearing. The Chinese apparently want more consultation with Washington on matters of mutual strategic concern, such as events in Africa, the Middle East and the Asian subcontinent. Brzezinski may accommodate them by requesting that they use their influence in Africa to mobilize support for the Anglo-American plan on Rhodesia.