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Most striking, Carter on Monday night spoke in somber Churchillian tones of sacrifices for everybody—but by week's end the White House indicated the sacrifices would not be financial, and indeed the program would save consumers money. A statement issued Friday night contended that without the program the average family's energy bill in 1985 would be $1,367; Carter's proposals would cut that figure 16%, to $1,145. That contention is highly debatable: it assumes that conversion to coal would free "old" and inexpensive natural gas now burned by industry to flow to homeowners, and that families will save heavily by insulating their houses. The White House estimate also appears not to count price increases on myriad products that might be forced by higher industrial fuel bills.
Much of the first burst of criticism came from special-interest groups, but many of their gripes were legitimate. Foreign automakers, for example, were frightened that their cars might not qualify for the rebates on fuel-efficient vehicles. Actually, they probably wilL; but rebates on foreign cars are certain to provoke the wrath of the United Auto Workers.
There was some grumbling that the President had overstated the dangers of the energy crisis. Carter played up a CIA report indicating that the world would begin to run short of oil as soon as the mid-1980s. In fact, the CIA study is questionable: its estimates of world demand are in some cases frankly guesswork, and they conflict with the calculations of other experts, notably those employed by the 24-nation Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Ralph Nader rather irresponsibly voiced doubt that there is any energy crisis: he asserted that "we have far more oil and gas in this country than the oil industry is officially willing to recognize." His argument is difficult to refute conclusively; the Government itself is dissatisfied with figures on the size of U.S. energy resources (TIME, April 18). Yet neither point makes much difference for policy. World oil reserves assuredly are finite, even if they might last a bit longer than the CIA thinks. Moreover, part of Nader's argument is that vast quantities of natural gas under the ocean (now unreachable) and oil shale in Western states (now far too costly to tap) might some day become accessible with improved technology. No responsible Government could bank on that.
More sage criticism focuses on three main points:
> The program, which is very modest compared with what it promises, is aimed too strictly at conservation, too little at increasing supplies of gas and oil as well as coal.
> It relies too heavily on Government taxation, too little on the workings of the market price mechanism.
> It is potentially more economically restrictive than it need be.