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How valuable is Portugal to the alliance? Theoretically, the military and naval surveillance functions carried out by NATO from Portuguese bases could be done elsewhere; the U.S. airbases in Spain are strategically more important than Lajes Field in the Azores. Nonetheless, the organization would find it awkward, at best, to let Portugal remain a member if Lisbon's government was dominated by the Communists or more extreme leftists. Such a development could strategically affect the western end of the Mediterranean and access to the Strait of Gibraltar; it could also influence the course of Spain's development in the post-Franco era.
Western European leaders are seemingly less worried than Washington is about the dangers, but they are nonetheless unhappy with developments in Lisbon. In an attempt to bolster the Portuguese moderates, the Common Market has told Lisbon that it cannot expect economic aid until there are assurances that Portugal will become a pluralistic society. Declared West German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher: "We have no interest in promoting a dictatorial development."
The enthronement of the Directory is a watershed for Portugal's revolution. Convinced of its own infallibility, the M.F.A. has chosen to ignore the mood of the country, which, according to both April's elections and more recent polls, strongly favors pluralism and a gradual path to socialism. By claiming total authority, the military rulers make themselves publicly accountable for the condition of the economy. Failure to solve Portugal's problems will surely create widespread public dissatisfaction.
Two Scenarios. Veteran observers of Lisbon's often baffling politics see two possible scenarios in the ensuing months; both focus on the left because rightist forces at present are completely scattered and discredited. One scenario is a relatively quick disintegration of the troika, with Gonçalves as the likely loser and the mercurial Saraiva de Carvalho emerging as a new strongman. Despite his popularity with the radical masses, the charismatic boss of the security forces would polarize discontent; he could only govern by imposing the kind of repressive measures the April 25 revolution supposedly abolished for good. Cunhal's party might be forced back into the opposition if that came to pass, because, it is believed, Saraiva de Carvalho has adopted the Maoist left's contempt for orthodox, pro-Soviet Communists. Because of their discipline, however, the Communists would be in good position to pick up the pieces if Saraiva de Carvalho should be unable to solve Portugal's economic problems.