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Conciliatory Tone. Ford's loyalty to Kissinger was put to the test when some top presidential aides—Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld, Counsellor Robert Hartmann, Congressional Liaison John Marsh and Press Secretary Ron Nessen—opposed Kissinger's heated reaction to the Viet Nam defeat. Prior to Ford's first major foreign policy address before Congress, they urged him not to concentrate too heavily on the fiasco or to blame Congress for it. They were also backed up by two noted Republicans outside the Government who sent word to Ford through Rumsfeld that they thought the President should take a conciliatory tone toward Congress and not ask for more military aid for South Viet Nam. Heartened by the growing support for his point of view, a presidential aide let members of the press know that Ford would be his own master in foreign policy.
But Ford's advisers underestimated the staying power of their antagonist. Compared with what Kissinger had suffered at the hands of the Nixon palace guard, the Ford crew behaved like rank amateurs. Kissinger made sure that his views prevailed in the President's speech, and Ford had no objections. Once they had lost the skirmish, the doves dove for cover, at least temporarily, and tried to conceal their tracks. Nessen fired one of his assistants, Louis M. Thompson Jr., who some said was being blamed for leaking the facts of the anti-Kissinger cabal to the press. In fact, Nessen is the prime candidate for the source of the leaks. By dumping Thompson, Nessen may have been trying to appease Kissinger.
Despite his obvious zest for office, Kissinger has devoted considerable thought to leaving it—but on his terms, at his own choosing. "Timing is everything," he has told friends. "You can leave office or you can be carried out of office. I'm not going to be carried out of office." TIME has learned in fact that
Kissinger was seriously thinking of retiring if the last round of Middle East negotiations had been successful. At the moment, precisely because of his setbacks, he is determined not to quit. It would be a reflection not only on him, he believes, but also on American policy. Both he and the country would look like losers, and to Kissinger nothing in statecraft is more important than appearances, for they may decisively influence other nations' actions.
Success Story. Foreign leaders tend to echo his argument. The British Foreign Office fears that his removal would encourage the Soviets to adopt a more aggressive posture in the belief that the U.S. was retreating from its international commitments. Danger zones might be vulnerable to Russian probes:
Yugoslavia, Finland, West Berlin, even Austria. Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East may have been frustrated, but both Israelis and Arab moderates continue to have confidence in him. Says former Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs Abba Eban: "Even with the present setback, the Middle East is an American success story."