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Little Help. How much help the Soviets are giving to Portugal's resurgent Communist Party is a matter of conjecture in Lisbon. Some estimates put the figure at $40 million to $50 million over the past year, much of it donated by Russian and East European trade union movements. Most Western diplomats believe that the highly organized Portuguese party, which survived five decades of underground existence under right-wing dictatorship, needs little outside financial help. "The Portuguese Communist Party does not need money," insists one diplomat. "The party is getting money from the banks, from private businesses. Since the banks are now operated by Communist-controlled unions, no one is going to say anything about it."
Octavio Pato, Portugal's No. 1 Communist after Party Chief Alvaro Cunhal, told TIME'S Martha de la Cal, "The money the party receives comes from its members and from contributions we get at rallies." The party's exact membership is a secret, but Western diplomats estimate it to be about 15,000. Pato added that when the party needs furniture or a car with driver, a notice asking for volunteers is simply put up on the headquarters' bulletin boards, and they always come forward.
Credit Terms. Soviet embassy staffers have established close relations with senior officials in such key ministries as finance, agriculture, fisheries and labor, offering advice and technical help. Says one Western analyst: "The main effort of the Soviet diplomats in Lisbon is being channeled in this direction rather than in guiding the Communist Party or engaging in large-scale KGB [Soviet secret police] activities." Beyond that, Warsaw Pact nations, led by Moscow, are now giving Portugal considerable economic aid in the form of favorable trade agreements and generous credit terms. Lisbon recently agreed to buy 1 million tons of crude oil from Russia, and has made other deals with East bloc nations for the purchase of commodities.
Despite the Soviet Union's pursuit of economic and political influence, few diplomats in Lisbon see the immediate danger of a Czechoslovakia- or Cuba-style coup. For one thing, foreign observers think it unlikely that Moscow would want to assume the burden of supporting the poorest country in Western Europe. For another, a Communist triumph in Portugal would threaten Moscow's policy of accommodation with the West. Indeed, London and Washington have warned the Soviets that an attempted Communist takeover in Lisbon would not only strike a "severe" blow at détente but might jeopardize the upcoming European Security Conference summit and Moscow's long-sought aim to formalize its borders with Europe.
The Russians would probably be satisfied with a coalition of left-wing militants and moderates pursuing a neutralist foreign policy. This does not mean that Portugal would necessarily pull out of NATO, in which it is a militarily feeble partner. Lisbon's contribution to European defense strategy has always been minimal; the Lajes base in the Azores and the Iberlant communications center are useful but are not today regarded by NATO experts as essential to the Continent's defense. Nonetheless, Portugal's loss to NATO could be serious, both symbolically and psychologically, should it come about either through formal withdrawal or because of anti-Western policies in Lisbon.