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The Shah's determination to hold on puts him at odds with some of Washington's present thinking on the subject. For decades the U.S. has supported the Shah as a defense against Soviet expansion in a region of strategic importance. There are firm reports that Foreign Service officers based in Iran have long been prevented by Washington from building close contacts with Iranian opposition leaders, lest this offend the Shah. President Carter still says publicly that the Shah deserves full American support, but there are signs that the Administration's emphasis, as a ranking U.S. diplomat puts it, is shifting to one of "helping the Shah to see the reality of his position." On the advice of former Under Secretary of State George Ball, who has just completed a crash study on Iranian policy for the Carter Administration, the U.S. is urging the Shah to modify his absolute rule in order to restore stability in Iran and the Persian Gulf. The increase of Soviet influence in the region (see map), most recently in Afghanistan, worries the U.S. The Administration is also concerned about the effects of Iran's instability on such other monarchies as Jordan and the king of petropowers, Saudi Arabia.
The Ball view, which is generally seconded by the State Department, is that the Shah is incapable of ending the unrest through military force. Says one U.S. expert: "Even if his army shot 5,000 people and imprisoned another 50,000, the Shah's fate would be sealed. The Shah's best hope, if he wishes to retain any symbolic position of esteem, is to make a dramatic declaration turning over his powers to an interim ruling group of elder statesmen. Otherwise, he faces the slow disintegration of his army and, eventually, his entire country." As of last week, this was one bit of U.S. advice that the Shah did not seem anxious to take.