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As examples of this once-over-lightly approach, the Africans cite Angola, where Washington missed an opportunity to enter a crumbling colonial situation on the side of guerrillas who at that time were outside the Marxist orbit. In the Horn of Africa, critics charge, the U.S. was apparently the last to know that Somalia was planning an invasion of Ethiopia's Ogaden region, thereby helping to create an opening for Moscow in Addis Ababa. In Rhodesia, Washington failed to put sufficient pressure on either the Patriotic Front or the Smith regime to achieve a settlement at a time when Smith desperately needed to make a better deal with Nkomo than the one he subsequently offered to Bishop Abel Muzorewa and the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole.
Finally, Carter turned off much of his African audience in Lagos by mixing an appeal for human rights with a warning against the Cuban influence. As the black Africans readily understand, every member of the United Nations has the right to ask for foreign military assistance, which the U.S. has often provided to clients of its own choosing—notably Kenya, Sudan and Zaire. Many black Africans fear that the U.S. is unable to distinguish between Communist-backed but legitimate liberation groups and committed Marxist revolutionary movements. Asks one Mozambican leader: "What are you Americans fighting here anyway—Cubans or white supremacists? We ask you for arms because we are fighting for majority rule, and you turn us down. Now we are fighting for majority rule with Communist guns, and you are still turning us down."
In answer, Administration officials argue that too often in the past the U.S. has ended up on the losing side of liberation struggles and that its belated courting of black African opinion makes good economic as well as political sense. U.S. trade with Nigeria, as Ambassador Young frequently points out, already exceeds that with South Africa. The Administration's policy is based on the firmly held premise that whether or not Washington supports it, Smith's internal settlement is a prescription for civil war.
"There's a tragic choice here," says Richard Moose, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. "I can understand those people who look at this situation and say, 'Here is Smith (whose history and track record perhaps they don't understand) offering genuine majority rule. Here are those moderate leaders on the inside who are willing to join with him. Here are these people on the outside whom we see as Communists (because they are taking Soviet aid). So let's cast our lot with the Salisbury talkers, because, after all, they represent moderation, stability and respect for white rights.'