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Edward Teller and his colleagues at the Government's Lawrence Radiation Laboratory in Livermore, Calif., had shown as early as the 1950s that a miniature H-bomb was scientifically feasible. However, the actual detonation of a neutron device did not take place until 1963 at the old Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada proving grounds. Though the test was successful, the neutron bomb did not win ready acceptance in Washington. Intent on building up a stockpile of conventional weapons in Western Europe, the Kennedy Administration shelved the N-bomb. The concept was revived in 1969 for an entirely different purpose: the U.S. wanted to develop a defense against incoming Soviet missiles by exploding nuclear bombs at high altitudes. Since such blasts might take place over American territory, low-yield neutron bombs seemed ideal. But once more, neutron bombs were ruled out of the strategic thinking, this time because the U.S. scrubbed plans to build the costly and complex antiballistic missile defense system.
In 1975 Defense Secretary James Schlesinger became convinced that NATO's conventional nuclear weapons were losing their effectiveness as a deterrent, and he persuaded President Ford to authorize funds for production of at least two neutron devices, at a cost of about $1 million apiece (twice the cost of conventional nuclear warheads). They were to be designed as warheads for either the new Lance missiles or 8-in. artillery shells. But the move created such a clamor that President Carter has now held up production and deployment of the weapons.
Carter's concern reflects not only the political fears that neutron bombs have raised but also the doubts of many scientists about their actual effectiveness. Despite the assurances of proponents that there will be minimal damage to civilians from the weapons, researchers can still only guess at some of the long-term consequences of even relatively mild doses of neutron bombardment, a form of radiation extremely lethal to living tissue. What is more, there is no assurance that an adversary will not adjust his tactics to minimize the damage to his own forces—say, by spreading his tanks so far apart that it will take dozens of neutron bombs to knock them out. Because of insufficient tests, there is no certainty how much radiation would penetrate an invading tank or how long it would take radiation sickness to kill enemy troops. Claims IBM Physicist Richard Garwin, a longtime Government defense consultant: "The neutron bomb is less effective than either the weapons we have now or the weapons the Russians have now." That is a minority view, to be sure, but it illustrates the scientific and military complexities of the N-bomb decision.