Man Of The Year: Anwar Sadat: Architect of a New Mideast

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flew to Ismailia on Christmas Day, Menachem Begin was fortified by the Israeli Cabinet's unanimous approval of his peace plans —approval gained in a 7½-hour closed session of the Cabinet. In his briefcase were the proposals that Begin had discussed with Jimmy Carter the weekend before, though by now they had been refined considerably. Begin's arrival in Egypt, like Sadat's in Israel, was another historic step, though this was no state visit. There was no pomp and ceremony. Only a small group greeted Begin's 707 as it landed at the military airbase of Abu Suweir—one that the Israelis had bombed in 1967 and 1973. An army helicopter then took Begin to Ismailia, where he and Sadat greeted each other warmly, like old friends. Within hours the leaders were able to announce substantial progress: two key committees would be formed, one headed by the respective Foreign Ministers, the other by the defense chiefs. These groups, explained Begin, "will work out all the details, which will lead to the signing of peace treaties." So alive now was the momentum for peace that one high-level Israeli official said he expected these special committees to convene within a day or two. The progress seemed so positive that Sadat invited Begin to stay overnight for further discussions. "Praise be to Allah," said Sadat, "that we have started giving a push forward even before the end of the talks."

Barring disaster, the Begin-Sadat Christmas meetings could produce an umbrella declaration of principles and perhaps a token arrangement of mutual good will. After that, the Cairo conference already in session could itself be raised to the ministerial level for purposes of negotiating a detailed settlement. Sadat has told TIME (see interview) of his willingness to make his arrangements with Begin, and then inform the other Arab states that he has negotiated a framework in which they too can negotiate. In effect, Sadat is thinking of a separate peace with sequels—leaving the other Arabs to work on their own special accommodations. To avoid appearing to have made his own deal at the expense of his Arab colleagues, Sadat could refuse to sign a formal peace treaty but instead initial a memorandum of understanding that would call for major withdrawals by Israel from the occupied territories. This might tempt Jordan, and eventually Syria, to talk separately with Israel.

Saudi Arabia, with its oil wealth and its links to both moderates and rejectionists, remains crucial to any permanent peace in the Middle East. Although the Saudis have been cautious since the beginning of Sadat's initiative, it seems unlikely that they would stand in the way of a settlement. They have not only invested heavily in Egypt's future, they have a political and economic investment in Middle East stability. The Saudis could play a key role in reconciling the Syrians to the Egyptian design for peace. The Syrian economy is in grave difficulty, with inflation running at 25%. If the Saudis offered major financial backing in return for a Syrian-Egyptian reconciliation, President Hafez Assad might have to assent, no matter how much he dislikes the idea of negotiating with Israel. But Assad's position is a delicate one. He belongs to a minority Muslim sect (the Alawites), and his seven-year-old regime is the longest that Syria has managed since 1946. Should he accept a