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Assad said as much at a Damascus press conference before flying off to Tripoli. Between Egypt and Syria, he said, there might be "disagreements on methods and perhaps on certain actions or incidents—but divorce between two brother countries, never." There was another small sign last week that Assad has not given up on Geneva. Without Syrian objection, the U.N. Security Council approved a six-month extension of the truce-observer force on the Golan Heights.
Most Western observers in Tripoli believe Assad joined the conference not to adopt the rejectionists' stance but to persuade them to modify and soften their attitude toward a peace settlement. The Syrian President is apparently convinced that the radicals can come to some sort of agreement that will counter what one of his aides calls "the present drift toward surrender." But any such agreement, as far as Assad is concerned, will have to rest on the premise that peace is the goal and war the last-ditch alternative. Depending on how the final summit declaration is worded, Assad may go along with Palestinian-proposed resolutions calling for economic sanctions against Cairo and other measures designed to isolate Sadat.
The rejectionist Arabs can denounce Sadat all they want, but basically they —and not Sadat—are the ones who face hard political choices. Egypt, with a population of nearly 40 million, is by far the most populous Arab state and has the largest army in the Middle East. Because of Sadat's cool relations with Moscow, Egypt's Soviet-supplied military machine is rundown and short of parts. Nonetheless, another Arab war against Israel would be possible only if Egypt joined in. Jordan has little air support for its small (85,000-man) but well-trained army. Roughly half of Syria's forces are either keeping the peace in Lebanon or guarding the tense frontier with Iraq. Libya and Iraq have plenty of Russian equipment to offer the confrontation states, but neither country borders on Israel. As for the Palestinians, their only option is sporadic terrorism directed against 1) moderate Arab states or 2) Israeli border communities. The latter choice almost invariably leads to savage reprisals.
One Palestinian organization, the Syrian-backed Saiqa, has put out a contract on Sadat's life. If he were assassinated, either by a random fanatic or a committed rejectionist, Egypt might well be ruled by a military leftist more attuned to the radical Arab message. But for the moment, at least, Sadat is politically secure at home.