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Wars have been fought and concluded, a generation has come and gone in the time it has taken to produce a treaty. Negotiations were triggered in 1964 when Panamanian students, outraged by the American flag flying in the heart of their country, rioted in the zone. With three American soldiers and 21 Panamanians dead, President Lyndon Johnson opened talks to revise the treaty. An agreement was reached in 1967, but its details were leaked, and conservative U.S. Congressmen protested so vociferously that L.B.J., up to his earlobes in Viet Nam, backed off. Before the treaty revision could be concluded, Torrijos in October 1968 overthrew the existing government and immediately spurned the accord. Making a new treaty his major issue, he abolished political parties, seized control of the press, drove opponents into exile and saw his once prosperous economy falter. Latin American and indeed world pressures began to build on the U.S. In 1974 Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and then Panamanian Foreign Minister Juan Tack signed a "statement of understanding" that renewed serious negotiations.
The issue of the canal was thrust into the last presidential campaign when G.O.P. Contender Ronald Reagan denounced the proposed treaty as a "giveaway." Jimmy Carter also pledged never to surrender "complete or practical control" of the canal. But once Carter was in office, he put the treaty near the top of his agenda. He named Diplomat-Lawyer-Businessman Linowitz to the U.S. negotiating team. As a former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American States, Linowitz, 63, had pleased and impressed Latin Americans. Moreover, he firmly believed in a new treaty.
Linowitz joined Career Diplomat Bunker, 83, who had been in charge of negotiations since 1973. They made a formidable team that Latin America called "Hit 'em high, Hit 'em low." Linowitz kept pressing hard, talking fast, rarely letting up. "He works with all his heart and lungs," said his admiring adversary Escobar. More low-keyed and taciturn, Bunker was an inspired contriver of compromises. He also defused arguments by occasionally dozing off—or seeming to.
The team had to cope with allies as well as adversaries. At certain critical points, President Carter disrupted negotiations by sounding off in public. In a speech last month, for example, he casually remarked that the U.S. might retain "partial sovereignty" over the canal even after 2000. Panamanians, who thought that issue had been settled, exploded in outrage until they were reassured by Bunker and Linowitz. "Well," noted a participant, "there isn't much we can do about loose language."
Negotiations were finally speeded up by an artificial deadline. At midnight last Wednesday (Washington time), Linowitz's six-month commission as special negotiator was due to expire. He would not have been ejected from the conference room. Nevertheless, he warned his fellow negotiators: "I guess I become a pumpkin at midnight." They made sure he stayed to the end of the ball. After a final, 14-hour marathon session, with only short breaks, they completed the treaty.