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Marshall's words that day in June 1947 not only gave desperate Europe a reason to hope but also snatched the initiative in the cold war away from Russia. Marshall wrought a revolutionary departure in American foreign policy, wrenching the nation out of an isolationist disposition that tracked back to George Washington. The European recovery plan that bore Marshall's name—Harry Truman insisted it be so titled—set the stage for the primary defense arrangements in use today by the Atlantic community. Without the economic and political base created by the Marshall Plan, NATO could not have come into being. Nor, likely, would the capacity of European nations for cooperation today ever have blossomed. The ideas that Marshall set forth are, in fact, still making history. At least an echo of his spirit of innovation could be heard last week in President Carter's promise at Notre Dame to "create a wider framework of international cooperation suited to the new historical circumstances."
As far as Marshall's audience knew before he spoke, the Secretary of State would merely add his bit to the usual commencement pieties. No ballyhoo had preceded him; no Washington flacks had scurried about alerting the press that a "major" statement would be forthcoming. In fact, say some who were there, neither Marshall's typically spare language nor his earnest but dry delivery awakened that gathering fully to a realization that here history was being made.
"I need not tell you, gentlemen, that the world situation is very serious," the speech blandly began. "That must be apparent to all intelligent people." Then Marshall sketched Europe's devastation and economic disruption:
"The town and city industries are not producing adequate goods to exchange with the food-producing farmer . . . People in the cities are short of food and fuel. .. The division of labor upon which the exchange of products is based is in danger of breaking down."
Europe, in short, was broke, shattered—and desperate.
In April, Marshall had come back from Moscow convinced that the Russians had every intention of exploiting Europe's misery. Then in May, Will Clayton, his Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, reported a rapidly worsening situation. Immediately, Marshall had given George F. Kennan and his policy planning staff two weeks to draft a plan to save Europe. Under Secretary Dean Acheson, as well as Clayton, contributed heavily to the proposals that were boiled down into the 950-word speech. Now Marshall came to the meat of it:
"The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements for the next three or four years ... are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character ... Aside from the demoralizing effect on the world at large and the possibilities of disturbances arising as a result of the desperation of the people concerned, the consequences to the economy of the United States should be apparent to all. It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace."
And then to the heart of it: