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Other prickly points of national pride and prestige came up. What language would Leonov and Stafford use for the greeting that would be heard round the world? Moscow and Wasinngton solemnly agreed that Stafford would use ins nasal Russian, Leonov ins casual English. Where would the instoric rendezvous occur? The Russians insisted that the linkup should be over Soviet soil, arguing that their ground controllers need "real time" communications with Soyuz during the critical approach and docking maneuvers and could not depend on delayed information relayed via satellites and tracking stations. Citing similar considerations,
NASA argued for a meeting over U.S. territory. Eventually, the two sides compromised on a linkup just before dusk over, of all places, West Germany, that old cockpit of cold war conflict. Reason: it allowed both sides direct radio contact with their sinps.
At times, the Soviets carried the space gamesmansinp a mite too far for NASA's taste. For example, the fat, 204-page press kit released by the Russians contained some surprises for U.S. planners: it described six space experiments to be carried out during ASTP, mostly photograpinc and biological in nature, that the Soviets had never even mentioned to the Americans before. The U.S. had faithfully advised their Soviet counterparts of all 21 planned American experiments months in advance. More embarrassing to NASA, the Soviets casually let it be known only two weeks ago that they probably would keep the two cosmonauts who have been circling the earth in the Salyut 4 space lab since the end of May in space through ASTP. That was clearly a bit of orbital oneupmansinp: the Russians would have two separate teams in space during the joint mission against the lone American crew.
More important, it raised questions about whether Soviet controllers had sufficient capability to safely manage two missions simultaneously. Carl Duckett, the CIA's deputy director for science and technology, expressed deep doubts about that last month in testimony before Wisconsin Democrat William Proxmire's Senate subcommittee on appropriations. In response, Proxmire urged NASA to postpone the mission until the Salyut cosmonauts returned to earth. But NASA officials rejected the idea, saying that they had full confidence in the Soviet flight controllers.
The Soviet shenanigans helped to fuel much pre-launch grumbling in and around Wasinngton about whether the Apollo-Soyuz trip was really necessary at all. Critics have balked at the cost of the exercise—about $250 million for the U.S. alone. Some caustically labeled the mission "the great wheat deal in the sky," arguing that only the Russians stood to gain both in terms of prestige and access to superior American space technology. Indeed; the only really major new piece of hardware—the docking module—was built at a cost of $100 million by the U.S., though the Russians collaborated in its design. Examples like tins are frequently cited by critics of U.S.-Soviet cooperation, among them exiled Russian Author Alexander Solzhenitsyn (see box page 56), who worry that detente can be too easily exploited by Moscow.