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This distinction could be crucial, though it has nothing to do with the potential destructiveness of NATO's new weapons. The critical point is that if war came, the Soviets would not be attacked at first by the monumental weapons that are part of the American strategic arsenal. Moscow might be more likely to retaliate against Europe with its own theater nuclear weapons rather than against the U.S. with strategic weapons. While the destruction from a theater nuclear exchange would be tremendous, it would still fall far short of the nuclear holocaust that would almost inevitably consume East and West. This reasoning was at the heart of Henry Kissinger's widely noted September speech in Brussels. Kissinger argued that the American strategic arsenal alone cannot be relied upon to defend Europe, since to do so would almost certainly elicit massive Soviet retaliation against the U.S.
NATO's deployment of theater nuclear forces is thus viewed as a means of closing a dangerous gap in the West's deterrence. Says a leading British official: "The reason for NATO modernizing its nuclear forces is that we have to fill a position between the tactical Lance missile [a short-range mobile missile] and the big bang. We cannot make counterthreats credible without theater nuclear weapons." Notes American Defense Analyst Gregory Treverton of the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies: "It is important to remember that deterrence is a combination of will and weaponry. Weapons do make a difference. NATO has to become more confident at a lower level of deterrence rather than at a higher level."
The decision to deploy theater nuclear forces has been two years in the making. British officials claim to be the first to have noticed the growing military imbalance in Europe; they sent a note about it to Washington in early 1977. Several months later, West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt raised the issue in a London speech. He deplored the fact that the "Euro-strategic balance" was shifting against the West and urged that it be restored. Soon thereafter, NATO created a High-Level Group, chaired by the U.S., to study the matter.
One year later the group began discussing specific options. Included were various mixes of Pershing Us, ground-launched cruise missiles and submarine-launched cruises, as well as weapons whose identities are still secret. The U.S. outlined the advantages and disadvantages of each of these items in terms of accuracy, payload, cost and political implications. Clearly, the Pershing II and cruises were the best solution to the new realities. Furthermore, neither was an entirely new system. Neither could be portrayed as a "terror" weapon like the ill-fated neutron warhead, which in the spring of 1978 had alarmed public opinion in Western Europe to the point where NATO governments hesitated about its deployment and President Carter decided to postpone the project.