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By designating Arafat as sole spokesman for the Palestinians, the Arab leaders at Rabat have tried to place the onus of the choice between peace and war squarely on the Israelis. Regardless of feelings about the P.L.O. leader in Jerusalem, he is now recognized by his Arab peers as the political voice of Palestinians everywhere. Although both Jerusalem and Washington hope that Hussein will still have a key role in negotiations over the future of the West Bank, Arafat simply cannot be ignored if a solution to the Palestinian problem is ever to be found. To dismiss him merely as a "terrorist" is a disservice to peace hopes; more than that, it fuels the arguments of Israeli extremists who want to retain all of the territory captured in 1967.
Great Imponderable. In some ways, Israel's situation is similar to that faced by the French in the Algerian war. Initially, the Paris government refused even to consider negotiations with the Algerian National Liberation Front; eventually, France found that the only possible hope for settlement was to deal with the F.L.N. The analogy, of course, is imperfect: the F.L.N. sought the destruction of Algérie Francaise not of France itself, whereas the P.L.O. at least so far is directly opposed to Israel's existence. Nonetheless, war will continue over Palestine until the Israelis are willing to talk to Arafat—and until Arafat is willing to talk directly to them.
Thus the onus rests on both sides. The Israelis undoubtedly want peace with their Arab neighbors, along with the secure borders specified in the U.N. resolutions. But they will never get peace until they are prepared to make major concessions to the Palestinians. Even in Jerusalem, there are many Israelis who agree that the Palestinians have a rankling historical grievance. But it is hard to believe that the Israelis will concede any territory to the Palestinians as long as the fedayeen are committed to Israel's destruction.
One great imponderable in the complexities of Middle East politics is whether Yasser Arafat will be able to modify his intransigent goals without losing the loyalty of his people. Many Arabs think that the fedayeen can eventually be tamed, and that the best way to start the process is to make them a serious partner in the Middle East dialogue. Certainly other revolutionary leaders—Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta, Algeria's Houari Boumedienne, to cite only two—have matured as they acquired power and responsibility.
Hard as it was for the Egyptians and the Israelis to begin even indirect negotiations, it will be infinitely more difficult for the Palestinians and the Israelis to make the first groping steps toward a dialogue of sorts. But those steps must be taken—and must be taken soon. Considering the level of tension in the Middle East, the only alternative is a new war that promises to be even bloodier than the last one.
* For a brief time last week, diplomats thought that the U.S. position had shifted. At his Washington press conference, President Ford went a bit beyond his briefing notes to call for "movement toward settlement of the problems between Israel and Egypt on the one hand, between Israel, Jordan or the P.L.O. on the other." Since Kissinger has no plans for dealing with the P.L.O. at present, high U.S. officials worked out a public clarification.