(7 of 8)
To try to carry out that policy, Sisco reportedly proposed in Athens that Sampson be replaced by a more moderate Cypriot as President, that Makarios be allowed to return to the island in his priestly capacity and that the Greek officers commanding the Cypriot national guard be withdrawn. The most the Greek junta was willing to do was to replace the 650 officers with other officers, which was scarcely a concession.
The Under Secretary did little better in Turkey, where some oversensitive officials complained that "the Middle East got Kissinger for a whole month and we get Sisco for a week." Discussions between Sisco and Ecevit started out poorly when Sisco, because of scheduling difficulties, dispatched U.S. Ambassador William B. Macomber to the initial session in his place. Since Macomber was lower-ranking than Sisco, Ecevit disdainfully shuffled him off to see Foreign Minister Turan Gunes.
When the two principals finally did meet two hours later, Sisco recalled that Ecevit was a "humanist" who had written poetry in his youth and asked, "How can you think of shedding blood?" Though Ecevit was still maintaining that no decision to invade had yet been made, he replied with a broad hint about Turkey's intentions: "I am convinced that my decision will prevent more bloodshed." He cited the 1967 Cyprus crisis, in which U.S. Mediator Cyrus Vance persuaded the sides to pull back and avoid fighting. "If your colleague had not convinced us to change our minds about military interference, Cyprus today would be an island of peace."
Actually Ecevit's government had already decided on an invasion. Even as Sisco sat with the Prime Minister on the midnight before the landings took place, the Turkish fleet was approaching Kyrenia and pilots were manning their planes. With Turkish passions for action running so high, Ecevit was certain that his government would fall if it backed down. Moreover he sensed that no country was eager to recognize Sampson as President of Cyprus and thus no major power would complain too much if Sampson was toppled.
Soviet Massage. Ankara was also being massaged into fighting by the Soviet Union, which was happy to see the two NATO nations involved in an imbroglio. The crisis enabled Moscow to draw closer to Turkey by offering the nation encouragement and even possible aid, and thus recover some of the leverage it recently lost in the Middle East. It also offered Moscow an opportunity to foment disarray in NATO without risking serious damage to detente.
Beyond that Moscow had a practical reason for wanting anti-Soviet Greeks out of power on Cyprus. The island is the key Middle East intelligence center for the Kremlin (as it is for the U.S.). Russia's Nicosia embassy is larger than any of its embassies in Cairo, Teheran and Beirut. A sophisticated communications center links the Cyprus embassy with Moscow and the Soviet Mediterranean fleet as well as with two Russian spy ships that monitor radio traffic off the Israeli coast. The entire operation would almost certainly cease if Sampson remained President of Cyprus.