The Nation: More Evidence: Huge Case for Judgment

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about the SALT talks then going on with the Soviet Union. That leak, said the President, "does affect the national security—this particular one. This isn't like the Pentagon papers."

> In a previously secret affidavit, John Ehrlichman swore before the U.S. district court that Nixon had given after-the-fact sanction of the Sept. 3, 1971, burglary of Dr. Fielding's office. After the break-in became known, the President publicly said that had he known about it beforehand, he "would have disapproved." Yet in a meeting with Ehrlichman on April 18, 1973, Nixon said that it had been "fully justified by the circumstances."

Nothing in the evidence indicates that Nixon knew in advance of the Fielding burglary, but he clearly created the mood of vengeance toward Ellsberg that led to it. He ordered Hoover to supply information on Ellsberg to Egil Krogh, the "plumber" who served 4½ months in prison after pleading guilty to violating Dr. Fielding's civil rights. Charles Colson, who has been sentenced to one-to-three years in prison for smearing Ellsberg, reported in a newly revealed affidavit: "The President from time to time expressed his dissatisfaction with the aggressiveness of the [Ellsberg] investigations ..." Moreover, in what apparently set the stage for the Fielding burglary, the President told Plumbers Krogh and Young to do whatever was necessary to get information on Ellsberg.

The evidence indicates that Nixon knew too of the psychological profiles on Ellsberg that were prepared by the CIA.

In the summer of 1971, under pressure from the White House, a CIA psychiatrist had prepared a first profile that described Ellsberg as brilliant and patriotic. That August Plumbers Young and Hunt, apparently not satisfied with the report, provided the psychiatrist with some FBI reports and Department of State documents on Ellsberg and ordered a second profile.

"These men," the psychiatrist recalled in a previously secret affidavit, "were interested in obtaining information which could be used to defame or manipulate Ellsberg." The result was an unflattering portrait that emphasized "strong, although fluctuant, emotional attachments" and "sudden and extreme shifts in loyalty and enthusiasm." The new report referred to Ellsberg as "a very intelligent man" and denied that he was "emotionally disturbed in a psychotic or gross manner." It briefly mentioned his sex life and two years of psychoanalysis, but its focus was on traumatic childhood experiences—especially a car accident at 15 in which his mother and sister were killed—to explain his alleged psychological instability.

The evidence does not indicate how the second profile was put to use. The CIA turned it over to Young in November 1971, along with a letter from Director Richard Helms that stressed that the agency's "involvement in this matter should not be revealed in any context, formal or informal." Helms' concern was quite understandable. The only other American citizen to have been the subject of a CIA psychological profile was Lloyd Bucher, commander of the spy ship Pueblo, which was seized by North Korea in 1968. The CIA's interest in Bucher was legitimately tied to national security; the agency wanted to know how well he was

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