The Phantoms were rushed off to Israel without public debate, but in confidence that the American public would approve. In the emergency, presumably no political conditions were asked of Israel either: this was not the time. A month ago such American aid to Israel might have risked Arab displeasure, even some oil blackmail, but would have counted on a quick Israeli military triumph. But what if—not to prejudge battles that have not yet been decided—Israel's situation were suddenly to take a turn for the worse, even become desperate? How deep then is the American commitment to Israel? Might the U.S., by sending Phantoms and missiles and other sophisticated weaponry, once again, so soon after Viet Nam, be starting down another slippery slope?
No treaties, such as the American NATO pledge to European partners that an attack on one is an attack on all, bind the U.S. to Israel's defense. The Israelis have not asked for one, in part out of their own self-confident, self-reliant distaste for alignment and dependence. The American tie to Israel, which is not to be found in formal treaties, surfaces more readily in presidential statements and the platforms of both political parties. American Jews are both articulate and influential, and their anxieties are deeply felt whenever Israel is in danger, but those ringing platform pledges were not written simply to appease them in defiance of a contrary mood among non-Jewish Americans. They too remember Hitler's holocaust and admire the tough independence of the Israeli people.
Aid to Israel differs from, more than it resembles the American involvement in Viet Nam. Democratic Israel is not a divided and apathetic people, authoritatively ruled, reluctant to fight its own battles. It does not ask for American soldiers. It is not quite an ally; in some respects it is a client, but it is in no sense a puppet of the U.S.
Yet another vital difference between supporting Israel and supporting Viet Nam must be acknowledged. Unlike Viet Nam, whose geographical relationship to the superpowers was peripheral, the Middle East is a critical area of contention. Prolonged active warfare between two sides, each supplied by a great power, could easily involve the great powers themselves in war. Supplying Israel with weaponry in measured response to Russian resupply of the Arabs may be an essential interim step to ensure Israel's survival, but it is not in the American interest to underwrite blindly Israel's own notion of sufficient victory or readiness to settle. The latent dangers in protracted fighting would quickly become evident to Americans if the Israelis at some point were to say that they are not only short of Phantoms but of trained pilots to man them. Would the U.S. then provide "volunteers"? The Pentagon's present answer to such future worries is: equipment yes, men no. Already Congressmen are warning against any commitment of troops. "Worst-case scenarios" are often an inhibiting guide in policy shaping, but they do suggest the vital American interest in peacemaking.