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Even as Thieu is expanding his powers, many South Vietnamese politicians are beginning to wonder aloud whether he will be able to hold onto them for much more than six months. The speculation arises because the North Vietnamese are apparently unwilling to accept American terms for a ceasefire. They assert that a political settlement must come first—specifically, the provision that Thieu must be removed from office. The South Vietnamese are well aware that while the U.S. wants an independent non-Communist South Viet Nam, Washington has nevertheless gradually acceded to more and more of Hanoi's demands. The North Vietnamese have never budged from their position that both the Thieu government and U.S. forces must go before there can be peace in Viet Nam. Now more and more Vietnamese are wondering if, in an American election year, the Nixon Administration may not be willing to make some sort of concession that would lead to the departure of Thieu.
At present Thieu's enemies do not represent a cohesive threat to his political survival. And Thieu's new muscle will make it even riskier for his opponents to speak out in favor of proposals such as a coalition government or a ceasefire. When General Duong Van ("Big") Minh circulated a petition calling for Thieu's resignation, he managed to get only 50 signatures —all from National Assembly members, who enjoy legislative immunity.
One new potential threat to Thieu, however, is the re-emergence of the Catholic church as a force in South Vietnamese politics. The Catholics have remained largely apolitical since the fall of Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963. But a number of Catholics quietly opposed Thieu's efforts to eliminate his opposition in the presidential elections last October, and many currently support a Catholic political coalition with the Buddhists.
To keep the opposition contained, Thieu is under considerable pressure to produce victories on the battlefield—or at least a credible counteroffensive. That would also help keep in check South Vietnamese doubts about his place in the Nixon Administration's scheme of things. If the South Vietnamese army can reclaim some of the territory lost in the Easter offensive and restore order to the stricken parts of his country, Thieu may be able to forestall the cease-fire that he seems to fear—or at least improve his bargaining position should a cease-fire occur.