(6 of 9)
For the near term, the guerrillas would be in bad shape. Not until December, perhaps, would they be able to resume a full schedule of raids against the Israelis, and by that time the winter rains would limit operations. They might hinder, perhaps by more skyjacks or other diversions, whatever peace arrangements United Nations Negotiator Gunnar Jarring may be able to work out with Egypt, Jordan and Israel before their temporary truce expires on Nov. 5.
Over the longer range, the outlook for the Palestine Liberation Organization is less gloomy. No Arab doubts that the guerrillas will remain a formidable political force. In the six years since they first began operations against Israel, they have grown to the point where they can only be temporarily subdued but not eliminated.
The seeds of the guerrilla movement were planted in 1948, when Israel was created out of ancient Palestine. Only some 160,000 Arabs out of nearly 1,000,000 elected to remain in the new Jewish state; 500,000 stayed in the Gaza Strip, held by Egypt, and on the West Bank of the Jordan River, taken over by Jordan. Another 700,000 Palestinians were dispersed as refugees; most ended up in 54 refugee camps in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon, where they remained, forgotten by the world and deliberately abandoned by Arab nations, who found them useful propaganda pawns in the vocal war against Israel.
From these camps, where the residents grew increasingly gray with despair, most of the first guerrillas were recruited. Studying the tactics of the Algerians against the French and even of the Jewish terrorists against the British in the pre-independence days of the mandate, Al-Fatah in 1964 launched its first raid—on a small Israeli pumping station. After that, Arafat's growing group carried out a raid a week to gain experience and with each raid slowly won more support. The Six-Day War in 1967, a debacle for Arab governments, was a boon for the guerrillas. It provided them with thousands of weapons discarded by fleeing Arab soldiers; a grim race went on to see how much of the ordnance the guerrillas could grab before Israeli salvage squads reached it. The war also displaced more Arabs in Gaza and the West Bank and bred frustration and resentment among Arabs toward their disgraced armies. At the same time, the war convinced the displaced Palestinians that other Arabs would never accomplish anything for them; the new nationalism provided more recruits than Arafat could easily handle. In March 1968, the guerrillas got another lift. When Israeli forces attacked the fedayeen stronghold at Karameh in Jordan, the guerrillas staged a creditable defense. They discovered that they could at least stand up against regular forces. Today the Palestinians have a new, bold self-image. "Cruel events since '67 have taught us one thing," says Nabeel Shaath, a Palestinian who lectures in economics at the American University in Beirut. "The only way to get the world to notice us is to speak and act as Palestinians."
Warring Ideologies
The guerrillas can thus survive, but to prosper they may have to change. Like many revolutionary movements, their central command is being devoured by warring ideologies.