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Castro, who had been an enthusiastic ally of Allende, charged that "U.S. imperialism had put down the revolutionary movement." Political leaders all across Latin America voiced their revulsion at the death of democracy in Chile. Mexican President Luis Echeverria, who had provided both financial and moral support for the Allende government, recalled his ambassador and offered asylum to any Chilean who sought it, specifically to Mrs. Allende. She refused at first, but at week's end changed her mind and accepted the offer. The Mexican government also ordered three days of official mourning, the first time it had so honored a foreign head of government since the assassination of John F. Kennedy.
Elsewhere in the world, there were clear signs that the Chilean President had gained instant martyrdom among radicals, alongside Patrice Lumumba of the Congo (now Zaire) and Che Guevara. In Paris, a crowd of 30,000 marched through the streets shouting, "Down with the murderers and the CIA!" In Rome, there were sympathetic work stoppages and eulogies proclaiming that "Allende is an idea that does not die." Even moderate politicians publicly regretted that another republic had succumbed to rule by junta. The West German government, for instance, expressed its "deep dismay" and its hope that "democratic conditions will soon return to Chile."
One country was conspicuously silent: the U.S. The Nixon Administration had been antagonistic to Allende ever since he emerged as the likely winner of the 1970 presidential campaign. Washington's hostility increased after Allende's new government fully nationalized copper mines and other industrial properties owned by U.S. companies and declined to pay several of them compensation. Relations between the two countries grew worse when it was revealed that multinational ITT had offered the U.S. Government more than $1,000,000 to help prevent Allende's election, and had held discussions with the CIA on possible ways to keep him out of office.
The Nixon Administration did what it could to make life for Allende uncomfortable, mostly through financial pressure on institutions like the World Bank. In August 1971, as a result of U.S. complaints that debt-laden Chile was a poor credit risk, the Export-Import Bank refused to make a $21 million loan to Lan-Chile airline to enable it to buy three Boeing jets, even though the airline had a perfect repayment record. U.S. exports to Chile overall declined 50% during Allende's three years.
Military Rapport. But the Pentagon remained on relatively good terms with Chile's military brass. Last year, for instance, the U.S. extended $10 million to the Chilean air force to buy transport planes and other equipment. The military rapport was so solid, in fact, that stories were circulating in Washington last week that U.S. officials had known about the coup up to 16 hours before it took place.