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Whatever else Sharp's trip may accomplish, it inspired one of the most remarkable cocktail parties ever held in Saigon. Staged by Canada's effervescent chief ICCS delegate, Michel Gauvin, it attracted 200 guests representing an unprecedented assortment of former enemies. On hand was TIME'S Saigon Bureau Chief Gavin Scott to take a few surreptitious notes:
There was courtly old U.S. Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, 78, looming over the implausible scene and nursing a martini with great dignity. Next to him, in a separate circle, stood General Tran Van Tra, chief Viet Cong delegate to the Joint Military Commission and the architect of the Tet offensive that reached to the very hallways of Bunker's embattled embassy in 1968.
In one corner was Saigon's Foreign Minister Tran Van Lam; in another stood Major General Le Quang Hoa, Hanoi's top man at the JMC, chatting amiably with Lieut. General Gilbert Woodward, his crusty American counterpart. "After the first 60 days of the cease-fire are over," Hoa told Woodward, "you must come to visit Hanoi." Woodward guffawed, then glowered at an eavesdropping journalist.
Ever since they arrived in Saigon six weeks ago for JMC sessions at Tan Son Nhut airbase, the Viet Cong have yearned for a chance to talk publicly and make propaganda, but the Saigon government has carefully kept them close to their quarters. On his first night out on the town, General Tra proved to be in an expansive mood.
Top Secret. The American G.I., said Tra, had been a worthy foe. "His equipment was better than anything we had. And there is no doubt that he was a good fighter and courageous. But an army has to have an ideal to fight for. It can't defeat an army that has a cause."
Was it true that the Viet Cong had received advance word on B-52 strikes, as some have claimed? Tra laughed. "We lived in the jungle and we knew the country and the leaves and the grass," he said. But what about the B-52s above? "We also knew our sky," he boasted. "We even knew the schedule of their flights. We had the support of the local people, and they told us the things we needed to know."
In looking back on the war, Tra was inclined to view the Tet offensive in 1968 and the Easter offensive in 1972 as the turning points. "The aim of Tet was to get the Americans to de-escalate," he said. "The aim of the 1972 offensive was to force the Americans to sign a peace agreement. These were both victories." And what of An Loc, the South Vietnamese town that held out for three months against the assaults of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese troops? Tra glowered. "There are some things that it is best not to talk about," he said. Was it true that he himself had visited Saigon on a reconnaissance mission before the Tet offensive? Tra smiled. "That," he said, "is top secret."