THE ADMINISTRATION: The Fight Over the Future of the FBI

  • Share
  • Read Later

(2 of 10)

loyalty to Nixon, failed to push the FBI'S Watergate investigation hard enough into high White House levels, where it might have further embarrassed the President. The hearings do indeed lead to that kind of conclusion, although Gray denies any such thing.

Gray's critics on the committee contend that his political favoritism is demonstrated by the close manner in which he worked on the investigation with one of Nixon's top legal aides, Presidential Counsel John W. Dean III. Gray readily admits having transmitted to Dean more than 80 FBI reports on the probe, including accounts of illegally monitored telephone conversations at the Democratic headquarters. Gray even allowed Dean to sit in on FBI interviews with White House aides suspected of involvement in the Watergate affair or other political sabotage. The Judiciary Committee voted unanimously to call Dean to testify about this cozy relationship with Gray. Nixon, invoking the broadest interpretation that any President has ever tried to apply to the concept of Executive privilege (see box page 28), said that neither Dean nor any other present or former White House aide will testify before any congressional committee.

The Gray nomination was thus deadlocked. Nixon was right, in a sense, when he noted at an impromptu press conference last week that Senators might hold Gray as "a hostage" in order to force Dean to appear. Yet if they were to judge Gray's fitness for his powerful post, the committee members had every right to ask Dean about his involvement in the Watergate investigation. Nixon's claim that he would never rely on Executive privilege to withhold "embarrassing information" but use it only to protect "the public interest" ought to free Dean to appear. Political embarrassment for Nixon is precisely what Dean's appearance might create, but the public interest could well be served by a full disclosure of the FBI's relationship with the White House. Without Dean's appearance, the Judiciary Committee seemed split seven to seven, with two other members undecided, on whether to send Gray's nomination to the Senate floor.* A tie vote would kill the nomination. But even if the committee recommends that Gray be approved, it seemed doubtful that the full Senate would go along.

So many legitimate questions about Gray's stewardship of the FBI have been raised that the image of the bureau would be seriously impaired by his confirmation. That image, under Hoover, was always overburnished by excessive pressagentry. Americans grew up in the 1930s listening to radio's Gangbusters, and kids eagerly wrote in to get tin badges as "Junior G-Men." Hoover used his headquarters flacks to ghostwrite hundreds of magazine articles glorifying the FBI under his byline. Then came a succession of movies (The House on 92nd Street, I Was a Communist for the FBI). In its prime The FBI was watched by 45 million televiewers a week. The movie and TV scripts, rigidly supervised by FBI officials, were often only remotely based on actual FBI files.

Elite. Although the FBI in its early days concentrated on auto thefts and illegal sexual conduct (Mann Act violation), its publicity was focused on its more dramatic gun battles with such romanticized thugs as "Baby Face" Nelson and John Dillinger. Later the FBI exploited its World War II investigations

  1. 1
  2. 2
  3. 3
  4. 4
  5. 5
  6. 6
  7. 7
  8. 8
  9. 9
  10. 10