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U.S. experts give Saigon's 587,000 regular troops a fair shot at dealing effectively with North Vietnamese main-force units—if they have ample air support. But no one knows what to expect from the untried irregulars who man the vital outposts along the roads and outside the villages. These Regional and Popular Forces boast 513,000 wellarmed, full-time troops, but they are unseasoned and would be no match for the tough Viet Cong or North Vietnamese professionals. As for the unpaid part-timers of the 500,000-man Popular Self-Defense Force, they are assumed to be so infiltrated by the V.C. that many Regional and Popular Force outposts will not allow P.S.D.F. troops in after dark.
There are other uncertainties. The Viet Cong infrastructure, for instance, might not be nearly so weak as is generally assumed. A sudden withdrawal or reduction of U.S. airpower would increase doubts about ARVN's abilities, even if the flow of American supplies and economic support continued. But for the moment, U.S. military men in Saigon and Washington remain reasonably sure that the newly Vietnamized war machine can accomplish its mission: to give the Saigon regime a "reasonable chance" of survival when American troops go home.