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Perhaps more important in the long run than the skirmishes over the draft bill was the defection of Senator Stennis. His resolution struck at the heart of the President's war-making powers. Not that he meant to be as unkind as he seemed. As the Senate sponsor of the draft-extension bill, he wanted to separate the problem of war making from the draft. But as a strict constructionist who opposed the Viet Nam War in the first place, he felt that the time was ripe to rein in the President's power to involve the nation in an undeclared war. His proposal would not apply to the Viet Nam War, but in the future it would allow the President to commit troops only in the case of an imminent or outright attack on the U.S., or if American citizens or armed forces were endangered abroad. He would then be permitted to use troops for a period of 30 days without congressional consent. In any other kind of conflict, only Congress could authorize going to war.
Encroachment. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of State William Rogers replied that such a bill would be an unconstitutional encroachment on the President's powers. Said Rogers: "To circumscribe presidential ability to act in emergency situations—or even to appear to weaken it—would run the grave risk of miscalculation by a potential enemy regarding the ability of the U.S. to act in a crisis."
Beyond question the President needs freedom to act in an emergency, but that is not the issue that Congress is now pressing. While the Stennis resolution exempted Viet Nam, it was clearly the Indochina war that had prompted him and animated his supporters. Very little in that war has required instant presidential decision; the vital choices have been made only after weeks or even months of mulling over by the commanders in Viet Nam, the civilian chiefs at the Pentagon, and the President and his men at the White House.