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The Nixon approach thus combines a conciliatory acceptance of new conditions with a firm stance in dealing with them. Coming out more candidly than any other U.S. President has ever done, Nixon concedes that the Soviet Union is a world power with legitimate self-interests beyond its own borders (see box). In the Middle East, Nixon admits, "the U.S.S.R. has acquired important interests and influence, and a lasting settlement cannot be achieved unless the Soviet Union sees it to be in its interest." In the Pacific, "the U.S.S.R. has a vital strategic desire to secure herself and her territories against China." In Eastern Europe, the U.S. does not intend to exploit its ties of friendship with Communist nations in any way that would "undermine the security of the Soviet Union." (Nixon says that he will "ask the Congress to provide authority to extend guarantees to American private investment" in Yugoslavia and Rumania.) And in the vital field of limitations on strategic arms, the U.S. acknowledges that "no nation will maintain an accord which it believes jeopardizes its survival." When the legitimate interests of the two superpowers collide, the President suggests, restraint and mutual concession are the only rational ways to accommodate their differences.
That acceptance of the facts of international life is a major theme of the report, and represents a welcome shift away from Nixon's earlier fondness for rhetoric that sometimes bordered on the superpatriotic or on cold war atavism. Even on the long-sensitive topic of Communist China, the report is conciliatory. For the first time, Nixon refers to China by its formal name, the "People's Republic of China," and he describes its residents as "750 million talented and energetic people." While still committed to the defense of Taiwan, the President hints that the U.S. may welcome China to membership in the United Nations if Taiwan is not excluded. Moreover, referring to Peking, he declares that the U.S. does not "wish to impose on China an international position that denies its legitimate national interests."
Freeze the Fear. The Nixon report is candid in other ways. Discussing U.S. attitudes toward South Africa, Nixon asserts that "racism is abhorrent to the American people, to my Administration, and to me personally—we cannot be indifferent to apartheid." But he argues that "resort to force would freeze the prejudice and fear which lie at the heart of the problem" and that rather than trying to isolate white regimes, "a combination of contact and moral pressure" is the best tactic. Throughout the report, Nixon repeatedly admits that his foreign policy options are severely limited by domestic opinion in the U.S.