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3) THE MIDDLE EAST. The two superpowers are at odds over how to achieve a peaceful resolution of Arab-Israeli hostilities. In a dazzling display of his personalized brand of "shuttle diplomacy," Kissinger successfully negotiated disengagement between Egypt and Israel. After his return from Moscow, he will attempt to work out a similar agreement involving Israel and Syria, a considerably more difficult task. The settlement talks began last December in Geneva under joint Soviet-American auspices. But the Russians, who for years have been the chief arms suppliers to the Arab world, feel humiliated and embarrassed that they have seemingly contributed nothing to the shaping of a possible peace and that Kissinger has quickly made friends with Egypt, once a virtual Soviet client. Soviet resentment is visceral and obvious: last week pointed articles appeared in Pravda and other Soviet publications charging that Kissinger had negotiated disengagement, not for the Middle East's benefit, but to protect U.S. oil sources. It was a rare criticism of the American agent whom the Russians know and like best of all.
As Kissinger admitted with some understatement at his Washington press conference, U.S.-Soviet relations have entered "a more difficult period." Beyond the agenda, there were other items to be discussed in Moscow that would make his trip particularly critical. In the course of his visit, as politely as possible, Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders were bound to ask critical questions that nag statesmen everywhere: can President Nixon survive Watergate, or should the Soviets prepare to deal with someone else? Kissinger's probable answer: Nixon will survive, but even if he does not, the institutional structure of the U.S. is strong enough to stand an impeachment trial, and the U.S. will fulfill its commitments to detente no matter what happens. Thus the Russians should look to their long-term interests in detente and not take a quick, dangerous advantage of a seeming American weakness.
For the President, who takes a special pride in his mastery of foreign policy, there may well be particularly poignant irony in the fact that Kissinger is now widely viewed as an autonomous operator who might well survive the collapse of the Nixon Administration. (Vice President Gerald Ford has made it clear that, should he become President, he would ask Kissinger to stay on.) Whatever private doubts Kissinger may have about Nixon's role in Watergate, he keeps them well hidden in public. Despite his immense prestige, the Secretary carefully preserves the ritual required of a subordinate who takes orders from a Commander in Chief. When in Washington, he consults daily with the President; on the road, he cables back reports and requests for foreign policy guidance when necessary.
Total Trust. Despite five years of close association, Kissinger and the President have a relationship that, in the view of White House observers, is best described as formal and correct rather than personal. Nixon's trust in Kissinger, on diplomatic issues, is total. The Secretary recognizes that the quickest way to lose his negotiating flexibility would be to exceed the President's instruction. Sums up Presidential Aide Alexander Haig: "I think the President considers Henry a unique national institution."