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Ervin: Well, certainly, the Committee to Re-Elect the President and the White House aides like yourself did not believe in the cause of burglars or wiretappers did you?
Ehrlichman: No. I didn't contribute a nickel, Mr. Chairman.
When Kalmbach later asked Ehrlichman's advice on how he should testify before the grand jury, Ehrlichman secretly taped the telephone conversation. Subpoenaed by the committee, the transcript showed that Ehrlichman admitted he had told Kalmbach that "it was necessary" to pay the defendants but that Kalmbach would testify that "it was strictly for the humanitarian" purpose, not for a coverup.
OFFERED EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY.
Dean has testified that he discussed with Ehrlichman a possible offer of Executive clemency for Wiretapper Hunt and that, apparently after checking with the President, Ehrlichman assured him that such an offer could be suggested to Hunt but not guaranteed.
Ehrlichman scoffed at Dean's charge, noting variations between a leaked version of the story and Dean's testimony before the committee. He accuses Dean of giving the story "an out-of-town tryout" and when that "wouldn't wash," changing his story. The testimony, Ehrlichman said, "likewise is not going to wash." Ehrlichman declared that he had never given Dean such an assurance on clemency, claiming as proof his contention that the President had flatly ruled out any clemency offers. He had discussed the matter with Nixon in July 1972, Ehrlichman reported, and the President "wanted no one in the White House to get into this whole area of clemency with anybody."
Aside from his own innocence, Ehrlichman said, "I have great difficulty in believing" that Dean told the President on March 21 that so many top associates—including Mitchell, Magruder, Haldeman and Ehrlichman, as well as Dean himself—were implicated in Watergate. The President gave no sign that he had such information in meetings immediately after that date; he asked none of his aides about such charges. Either Nixon was still convinced that they were not implicated, Ehrlichman said, or "he was involved in setting a few snares on the trail and was playing it cool." But by March 30, Ehrlichman continued, Nixon was convinced that "Dean is in this so deeply" and asked Ehrlichman to take charge of the White House investigation, replacing Dean.
Ehrlichman turned to his task energetically, interviewing ten White House or Nixon-committee officials, secretly taping some of the interviews. He produced notes from these conversations written with personal shorthand symbols (see cuts page 25), and he is certain to be grilled about them when he resumes his testimony this week.
While assailing Dean for failing to keep the rest of the White House staff fully informed on who might be implicated in the scandal, Ehrlichman revealed under questioning that Dean had never been asked to carry out an investigation—contrary to the President's claim. It was merely "assumed" that Dean's job as "conscience of the White House" meant that this was automatically his duty. To ask Dean to do his duty would have been to "insult his intelligence."