HARDLY any Administration is free of scandal. Harry Truman had T. Lamar Caudle and assorted "five-percenters." Dwight Eisenhower had Sherman Adams and his vicuna coat. Lyndon Johnson had Bobby Baker—and Abe Fortas. To a cynical public, the recurrent surfacing of peculators and huggermuggers suggests that almost everyone in Washington is on the take. The truth is more reassuring, though bad enough. The capital does tolerate unsavory practices that could and should be stopped.
If it is any consolation, moral standards in Washington have rarely been higher than they are today. For most of the last century, many famous politicians were plainly crooks. During Andrew Jackson's fight against the Second Bank of the U.S., Daniel Webster, Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun sold their votes and oratory to the bank. In the Civil War, great fortunes were hatched from corrupt federal contracts. Early in the 20th century, the National Association 'of Manufacturers bought Congressmen and influenced appointments to key committees. Nothing since has matched the gall of Harding's Interior Secretary Albert B. Fall, who pocketed $268,000 in the Teapot Dome caper.
Influence is the Washington grail. In a sense, influence peddling is what democracy is all about. The voter who complains to his Congressman about air pollution is peddling his influence, though far less openly than an industry promoting a tax break. The conflict between group interests, which defines U.S. politics, has also produced an army of expert lobbyists, many of whom actually improve lawmaking by carefully analyzing bills that help or hurt their clients. On some issues, lobbyists cancel one another out, and the merits decide the case. Unfortunately, the game lacks adequate rules.
The U.S. Code requires the registration of all lobbyists who plead before Congress, but the law is so full of loopholes that probably more do not register than do. Until this year, one of the most effective lobbies, the National Rifle Association, did not consider it necessary to admit that it was any such thing. Powerful individual lobbyists like Lawyers Clark Clifford, Thomas G. Corcoran and Abe Fortas in his precourt days earn their high fees by dealing directly with important friends. A phone call is often all that is needed. During the Truman era, James V. Hunt was able to do wonders for aspiring Government contractors by calling his friend General Harry Vaughan, Truman's military aide. Though no evidence of a direct payoff was uncovered, Vaughan did receive a freezer from one of Hunt's clients, and the Democratic Party was the recipient of numerous gifts. A few years later, Boston Industrialist Bernard Goldfine gave a vicuna coat to Sherman Adams, Eisenhower's chief White House aide, who intervened for Goldfine with two regulatory agencies. Again, there was no evidence of a payoff, but Adams was forced to resign. Lobbyist Julius Klein had such a grip on Senator Thomas Dodd that he was able to write him bullying instructions. It is probably neither possible nor desirable to curb the lobbyists, but how can public servants be protected from temptation?