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Doctrine. In it, Moscow claims the right to intervene in any socialist country that departs from the practice of Soviet-style Communism. If Yugoslavia were attacked, what could and should the U.S. do? It is the kind of question that Washington does not like to answer in advance out of the understandable feeling that simply shaping a scenario may contribute to its coming true. But the surprise of the Czechoslovak invasion has made it a prudent exercise.
Pressure to Act. Since Yugoslavia is not a member of NATO, the U.S. is not bound to come to its defense. However, a Russian occupation of Yugoslavia would imperil vital U.S. interests. Greece and Turkey would be further isolated from their NATO partners. Italy's long Adriatic coast would be left uncomfortably exposed. Neutral Austria would be surrounded on three sides by the Soviets. Western Europe would be demoralized. Consequently, despite the absence of formal alliances, there would be great pressure on the U.S. to act.
The U.S. response would be influenced by how events unfolded in Yugoslavia. If the Red Army were able to occupy the country as swiftly as it seized Czechoslovakia, the U.S. could do little beyond protesting. But in the case of Yugoslavia, there would be a considerable prelude to invasion. The Soviets would first have to consolidate their position within the Warsaw Pact by bringing Rumania to heel, through either political or military means. Provided the Rumanian episode itself did not turn into war, the U.S. would have ample time to warn the Kremlin against attacking Yugoslavia.
If the Soviets invaded in spite of the warning, they would most likely strike across the flat Hungarian plains with swarms of tanks and some 500,000 Warsaw Pact troops. Armored columns would race toward the capital of Belgrade, the transportation center at Zagreb, and the vital mountain passes near Ljubljana, thus severing possible aid routes from Italy. Smaller diversionary attacks would be made along the Rumanian and Bulgarian borders. The Red Army commanders would most likely employ airborne units to seize cities where rugged terrain made the use of armor impossible.
Tito has massed all his army along the 800-mile frontier with his Warsaw Pact neighbors (troops previously stationed around Trieste were withdrawn after Italy promised not to make trouble on the border). In case of invasion, the army's mission would be simply to slow down the Red Army advance by three days or so and then slip into the mountains to join the 700,000 partisans who in the meantime would have unlimbered their weapons and formed their bands. Already, much of the army's heavy artillery and armor is cached away in the mountains, mainly around the small industrial town of Titovo-Užice, 75 miles south of Belgrade. It was Tito's World War II partisan headquarters.
There are well-rehearsed contingency plans to transfer the country's vital government offices, bullion and important state papers to the mountains so that Tito would retain a functioning government even if the cities and lowlands were in Soviet hands.