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Defensive Stance. The chants and the rhetoric will initially be pure Mao, but the leadership's preoccupation will be with such necessities as the restoration of law and order, the rehabilitation of the economy, a toning down of the conflict with the Soviets. There may even be concessions to private incentive. The compelling need to restore domestic calm might be enough to keep the nation out of foreign adventure. China's military stance is therefore likely to remain defensive for some time—provided the feud with the Soviets does not get out of hand. The dispute between the two nations is at an extremely sensitive juncture. For roughly three months, the Soviets have been exerting strenuous efforts to draw China into negotiations on border problems; to give their attempts muscle, they seem to be implying that unless the Chinese agree to a resumption of talks, Moscow might settle the issue by force, perhaps by a preemptive strike against China's nuclear installations.
Sick Fifth. Whatever the complexion of the post-Mao leadership, some very basic problems facing China will not fade away in the foreseeable future. The country will have a population of 1 billion by 1980, yet still lacks the solid industrial base that is a must for any modern power. Somehow, Peking will have to reassert the central government's authority over the vast hinterlands—something it lost during the Cultural Revolution. At the same time it will have to determine whether it should soften its standoffish attitude toward the rest of the world. Eventually it will no doubt have to consider toning down its hostility toward the U.S., which has moved from a romantic and sometimes patronizing vision of China to one of exaggerated fear, abetted by China's unyielding animosity. Washington could aid a change in Peking's posture by breaking down some of its own barriers against China and venturing a more conciliatory attitude.
"In the long run," says Harvard's Edwin O. Reischauer, former U.S. Ambassador to Tokyo, "the chief problem that China presents may not be the danger that it will be so rich and strong, as well as hostile, that it menaces our basic interests, but rather that it may fall so short of meeting the economic needs and aspirations of its people that it remains an unstable and sick fifth of humanity." Not until Peking's leaders begin to busy themselves with the task of satisfying those basic needs will China be able to set out on the long road that Mao talked about 20 years ago.
* Peking has an estimated 100 nuclear devices, including hydrogen bombs, but it is only now developing and testing the medium-range missiles needed to deliver them. Tokyo's Asahi Shimbun reported that the Chinese had conducted an underground nuclear test early last week; the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had no comment.