In a design for Asia's future, there is no room for heavy-handed American pressures; there is need for subtle encouragement of the kind of Asian initiatives that help bring the design to reality.
Writing in Foreign Affairs two years ago, Richard Nixon presented this guideline for U.S. policy in Asia after the Viet Nam war is ended. Last week Nixon began to put his precepts into practice with some fast-moving diplomacy. Timed to take advantage of U.S. prestige refurbished by the stunning Apollo 11 moon flight, the President's foray called for stops in the Philippines,
Indonesia, Thailand, India and Pakistan before he leaves the Orient for Rumania and Britain. The itinerary demands considerable finesse.
Cautious Concern. There is concern among Asian allies as to what turns U,S, policy is taking. The Administration has already shown that it places the highest priority on disengaging from Viet Nam, and Washington well recognizes that this causes jitters in Asia. Said a top White House aide: "Relations between the U.S. and many parts of the world, but particularly Asia, are at a turning point. There is an inevitable concern in many countries, especially in Asia, as to what the American post-Viet Nam role in their part of the world will look like."
Nixon's mission, in large measure, is to reassure Asian allies that the U.S. will remain a Pacific power with interest in the future of Asia. However, that concern will be balanced with caution. For President Nixon, the overriding consideration is that there be no more Viet Nams.
While the President admits that the greatest threats to world peace in the next two decades lie in Asia, purely military U.S. involvement, both in dollars and personnel, will be reduced. He will seek to increase economic assistance. Nixon is mindful of the surging economies that U.S. aid has helped create in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan; because of that strength, the Administration has requested $800 million in its foreign aid bill for economic assistance to Asia outside Viet Nam. Formal mutual-defense commitments such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) will be honored, but the U.S. will expect Asians to bear more of the military load. Counterinsurgency operations will be handled on a country-to-country basis. The basic premise is that the U.S. will support its allies in war, but will not fight for them.
The President now stresses Asian action on Asian problems. Nixon will ask Asian leaders the extent to which they would be willing to help supervise elections in Viet Nam and police a ceasefire. He is also lending discreet support to the embryonic five-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a means of shaping a regional community. Underlying all considerations is the overweening presence of Communist China.