(9 of 10)
Charles de Gaulle has not been an ad mirer of U.S. Presidents. According to Author Pierre Galante, he called Frank lin Roosevelt "a false witness," Harry Truman "a merchant." Of Dwight Eisenhower, he said: "I am told that on the golf links he is better at putting than he is with the long shots. This does not surprise me." To De Gaulle, John Kennedy "had the style of a hairdresser's assistant—he combed his way through problems." Lyndon Johnson was like "a truck driver or a stevedore—or a legionnaire." Nixon and the general should strike it off fairly well. Both are direct, practical men, and De Gaulle showed characteristic prescience in granting Nixon a 40-minute interview in June 1967—at a time when De Gaulle would not have welcomed L.B.J. into the Foreign Legion. De Gaulle respects a tough adversary, and Nixon has been advised to be polite but firm.
There has been some thawing in relations between France and the U.S., though it has not affected the fundamental differences over NATO, European unity, monetary policy, and relations with the Soviet Union. These will doubtless endure even after De Gaulle has faded from the scene. De Gaulle still speaks of his "omnidirectional" nuclear force de frappe, but he no longer bestrides Europe like a Gallic Cyclops. Soviet adventurism has set back De
Gaulle's cultivation of the East bloc. His aura of omniscience was rent by the uprisings of last May; the hard-pressed franc faces another battering from new social-welfare expenditures and an upcoming round of wage demands.
Two major sources of Franco-American friction have been somewhat smoothed. The Paris peace talks have ended the general's diatribes on Viet Nam. Also, Nixon's acceptance of the French initiative for four-power talks on the Middle East shows mutual interest in a more balanced approach on both sides. The U.S. has considered France too pro-Arab, and the French find the U.S. too pro-Israel. No major breakthroughs are possible in Nixon's talks with De Gaulle, and he expects none. On the question of Britain's admission to the Common Market, Nixon could not budge De Gaulle, even if he were to try.
Despite the vicissitudes of the franc, De Gaulle insists that gold should ultimately be the sole international monetary standard, and that its official price must be increased, thereby devaluing the dollar. The threat of a fresh monetary crisis will dominate the Nixon-De Gaulle conversations. France's President hopes either to avoid that crisis altogether, or, if it comes, to make sure that it is not blamed on him alone. To that end, he wants joint efforts by the U.S., Britain and France to contain inflation and improve their balance of payments positions. Otherwise, he might have to devalue the franc by 20% or more—which would set off a shock wave of devaluations and imperil both the dollar and the pound.