(10 of 10)
Moreover, the longer the Arabs take to begin talking peace, the more conditions Israel is likely to add. Defense Minister Moshe Dayan last week said that Israel should keep the Gaza Strip —and, although the government denied that his words were official, it did not say that they were necessarily wrong. Another area that Israel is getting increasingly attached to is the west bank of the Jordan, where Israeli administrators are finding it easier than they had thought to govern a large Arab population. Not only that, but the fertile west bank would make an attractive place in which to move the 315,000 refugees now crowded into the Gaza Strip, say the Israelis. The Israelis are also disposed to hold, or at least insist on the demilitarization of, the Golan Heights of Syria, which not only served as a launching platform for Syrian shells aimed at Israel but also controls one of the sources of the River Jordan, which the Arabs have threatened to divert. For their part, the Israelis hold out, among other things, the possibility of giving Jordan access to a port on the Mediterranean coast, forming a joint development plan and even integrating the communications systems of the two states—all points that would greatly benefit Jordan's economy.
King Hussein recognizes the reality of Israel's existence better than any of the other Arabs, and he knows that the failure of his fellow Arabs to recognize it can only mean continued strife for the entire Middle East. The Arabs are already beginning to squabble among themselves again, and some heads are bound to roll when the first shock of defeat wears off. "If the situation persists," warned Hussein last week, "there is a grave danger that war will occur again." That danger was illustrated dramatically by last week's Arab-Israeli clash at Suez, which quickly escalated from sporadic firing to aerial dogfights and full-scale cannon barrages.
Having told their people for so long of the impossibility of accepting defeat, the Arab leaders will have to teach them to accept the inevitable postwar concessions if they hope to survive negotiations. And negotiations must come, no matter how long the Arabs drag their feet. King Hussein runs a very real danger to his own person and throne for his efforts, but in the long run he is bound to help the Arab cause by raising a voice of comparative reason and moderation at a time when Arabia needs it more than ever before.