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Giap's other nightmare is U.S. mobility—embodied in the helicopters of the 1st Air Cavalry, which has killed more of his men than any other U.S. unit. Helicopter squadrons are being added now to all U.S. infantry units in Viet Nam. That mobility and the omnipresent U.S. attack aircraft mean that battle almost always signifies horrendous losses these days, and for seven months Giap has prudently chosen not to engage his forces in strength. This has led some observers to wonder if he has any choice but to abandon the counteroffensive of Phase 3 in South Viet Nam.
But can Giap afford that, either? Having brought his twelve regiments down from the North with the promise that they were about to liberate South Viet Nam from the "neocolonialist U.S. aggressors," Giap cannot for too long let them sit idle. Deserters already are reporting a declining faith in ultimate Red victory, which needs bolstering by massive intervention from North Viet Nam or Red China. Moreover, the arrival of the northerners has whetted the southern Viet Cong's expectations of early victory. Not to fight now would hit Viet Cong morale hard, dampen revolutionary zeal, and heighten southern fears of betrayal by Hanoi.
So, sometime in the July and August monsoons, the U.S. expects Giap's men to surface again in numbers to seek a series of "Dienbienphus"—dramatic victories over sizable U.S. units—in the hope of crushing U.S. determination in the same way France's will was destroyed. If the American mood is hardly that of the French in 1954, Hanoi seems aware of the fact. It leaps on every antiwar demonstration, draft-card burning and Fulbright speech as indicative of a national defeatist psychology.
If Giap strikes, the most likely targets are the U.S. bases in the Central Highlands north of Saigon or the isolated Special Forces camps along the Cambodian border. The major U.S. units like the 1st Air Cav at An Khe are confident that they can handle anything Giap can throw up, but the Green Beret camps are indeed vulnerable. Even going after them, the Communists may be in for some nasty surprises. Six of the camps most likely to be attacked have been protectively "adopted" by F-4 Air Force squadrons at Cam Ranh Bay. Each squadron watches over one camp, and its pilots overfly it protectively when returning from their daily strikes elsewhere.
Spoiling Tactics. The monsoon offensive this year may well come off—but may end up being conducted by the U.S., not Giap. Last week in Kontum province north of Pleiku, the U.S. 101st Airborne struck into the heart of Giap country, where some 7,000 Communist troops are in hiding. They struck pay dirt, flushing an estimated two regiments of North Vietnamese regulars for some of the fiercest combat of the long war. "This is a battle at our instigation," said a U.S. officer, "we call this the conducting of spoiling tactics—to hit the enemy before he hits you."