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Chances of Reconciliation. The satellites' continuing desire for a richer, relatively more capitalist consumer economy is one major reason why a true reconciliation between Moscow's world and Peking's world is so difficult. Mao Tse-tung's China still regards all this as a dangerous betrayal of Marxism. Thus the deep differences over economic policies, and the national and racial rivalries, remain. There is no sign that Peking will or can give up its competition with Moscow for the allegiance of the underdeveloped nations.
With the added prestige of its new atomic bomb, Peking has no reason to give an inch to the Russians. Last week People's Daily in Peking again blasted Khrushchev and "modern revisionism," which "emasculates the revolutionary working class." While Peking also urged Russia to join China "against the common enemy," Mao was not about to give up his version of Communism.
And what could Russia really do to patch the rift? B. & K. are saddled with a weak economy, cannot afford the massive economic aid that, before 1960, kept Peking tied to Moscow's side. Token technical aid could be offered, and the new Russian leaders might win some Chinese good will by showing a more aggressive face to the West.
As a result of these distinctly limited possibilities, the anniversary "summit" fell far short of being a reconciliation meeting. Still, there were soundings and sniffings to find approaches to unity. In an anniversary message, Mao called for Communist unity to make the imperialist camp "shudder." At the very least, all parties hoped to avoid a return to the vitriol and vituperation that had marked the conflict during Khrushchev's last days. Both sides could benefit from a truce. And even a semblance of unity between Communism's two empires could make the West's life somewhat more difficult. Western policymakers have become extremely fond of the Communist split: whenever they ran out of ideas, they could always bank on the troubles the Reds were having among themselves. But whatever their differences with Moscow, the Chinese are fighting the U.S., not Russia, in Viet Nam and, more or less directly, throughout Asia. In short, no doubt Moscow will continue to have a serious China problem in dealing with Asia's tough, arrogant and infinitely patient giant. But Washington has a China problem too, and one that is considerably more serious and pressing.