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U.S. strategists had little time to congratulate themselves on the success of their "limited and fitting" answer to Red aggression. The big question was how North Viet Nam—and far more significantly, the Red Chinese—would react to the air strikes. And well before the first plane took off, the U.S. began a well-calculated redeployment of its forces to prepare for any Red move.
Immediately, Sharp began shuffling forces in his own command. An antisubmarine task force, led by the carrier Kearsarge (famed for its recovery of orbiting U.S. astronauts), swept into the South China Sea to watch for Red China's roving fleet of submarines. A squadron of Air Force F-102 supersonic interceptors bolted from Clark Field in the Philippines to bases in South Viet Nam to counter any attempt by the Chinese to bolster the Viet Minh with jets. Amphibious landing craft silently embarked for undisclosed destinations.
The Pentagon meanwhile worked out broader plans. The Joint Chiefs transferred an attack carrier group with the flagship Ranger from the First Fleet along the west coast of the U.S. into Sharp's Pacific area. Thailand agreed to accept two squadrons of U.S. Air Force fighter-bombers. More than 50 F-102s and B57 Canberra jet bombers took up residence at airfields at Danang, Saigon and Bienhoa in South Viet Nam. Near Bienhoa, a B57 crashed into the jungle with Capt. Fred C. Cutrer Jr. and Lieut. Leonard L. Kaster aboard. Hampered by Communist guerrillas, rescuers were unable to find the flyers. Flights of F-100 Super Sabre fighters, RF-101 Voodoo reconnaissance planes and F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers swept out of the U.S. and streaked toward Pacific bases.
The rapid movement of naval and air units demonstrated the value of a flexible response capability in the U.S. military forces. So, of course, did the dramatic use of carrier airpower along the Gulf of Tonkin. That flexibility and the U.S. advantage in military technology are what made last week's firm U.S. military stance throughout Southeast Asia credible.
Strong on Land. The adversary boasts power too. Red China has 2,500,000 troops to throw into land action. Most of that manpower is still positioned opposite Taiwan. Three armies (about 120,000 men) are near North Viet Nam, another on the island of Hainan in the Gulf of Tonkin. U.S. intelligence says that there has been no recent buildup in these southeast concentrations. The Red Chinese air force, with some 2,000 jet fighters and bombers, is one of the world's largest, but is hampered by shortages of parts and fuel. And her navy is weak: she has 28 subs and about 170 torpedo boats; her largest ships are four destroyers.
While North Viet Nam lost half of her navy last week and has at best about 50 aircraft (presumably none of them jets), her well-trained and high-spirited army numbers about 300,000, backed by a 150,000-man militia. These troops could be checked in a major drive into South Viet Nam only by a direct, all-out U.S. effort. (Last week a North Viet Nam infantry regiment stared across the Ben Hai River at a reinforced Saigon division in South Viet Nam. Neither showed signs of moving.) Hanoi's greatest weakness in such a drive would be her vulnerable supply routes.