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The Crowded Act. Mann himself was then Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Around and about him was a "task force" headed by aging, imperious Adolf Berle, a Latin expert under F.D.R. There was also a youthful White House speechwriter, Richard Goodwin, whom John Kennedy fancied as a real idea man about Latin America. Berle and Goodwin superimposed their decisions and advice on those State Department regulars, and there is little doubt that one reason for the Bay of Pigs invasion fiasco was the number of fingers dipping into the Cuban problem. U.S. policy toward Latin America was in a state of confusion, conflict and frustration. Once more Mann asked to get out, soon left for the ambassador's post in Mexico.
For months there was no Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. Then Kennedy brought in Robert Woodward, a career diplomat. He lasted a year. In the meantime, Harvard Historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. joined Goodwin in making White House policy to go along with the State Department policy Berle was making and the programs put forth by the CIA and the Defense Department. Bobby Kennedy tried a trip to Latin America; so did Adlai Stevenson and Kennedy himself. Eventually, Edwin Martin was made Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs. He served until President Johnson, in his first major appointment, returned Mann to the job he had left nearly three years before and sent Martin off as ambassador to Argentina.
During this entire period, the Alianza para el Progreso remained the top conversational subject in U.S.-Latin American relations. The Alianza pledged $20 billion in aid (mostly U.S.) over ten years, plus a highly ambitious investment of another $8 billion annually from Latin American business and government. As its goal, the Alianza aimed at increasing the per-capita growth rate of each country by a whopping 2.5% a year. To get the cash, each Latin American country would submit a blueprint for social reforms—from schools to housing to tax collection to cutting up the wealthy landowners' huge holdings for small farmers' use.
So far, the Alianza has fallen far short of its promises. Few governments have accomplished much toward real reforms; yet nearly all have collected millions of dollars—as "emergency loans." Said Alfonso Gumucio Reyes, Bolivia's Minister of Economy: "To speak the truth, I am not satisfied with the Alianza. It is an engine that is idling. Did it raise too much hope? Kennedy suggested that a miracle was about to happen. But unless this sense of urgency is duly acknowledged, it will be difficult to stem the masses' loss of faith."
Two Kinds of Nationalism. Thomas Mann, the Texas pragmatist, still thinks there is hope. "I believe in the Alianza" he says, "But we must not believe that it is going to solve all problems. It is not a panacea. Countries lacking a good internal structure cannot expect to prosper with Alianza help—or, for that matter, with all the money in the world. Each country has to be studied as an individual case with individual idiosyncrasies and approaches. Our intention is to work with anybody who seriously wants to survive."