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The main differences between the peace and prosperity of 1954 and of the '20s were: 1) 1954's peace and prosperity had, in reality, far better prospects; 2) the 1920's feeling of confidence, which proved illusory, was much higher. Americans of 1954 knew that the technical peace was not real, that they had to keep almost 3,000,000 men under arms, maintain a peacetime conscription and spend an average of $855 a family for defense. The year that saw the hydrogen explosion at Bikini—the biggest explosion in man's explosive history—was not one to foster illusions about an indefinite peace.
Yards Gained. The U.S. needed all its strength and confidence to handle 1954's struggle with Communism, which has been the overriding issue of every year since 1945. Dulles both drew upon and nourished U.S. confidence in its national strength. Far from offending allies, this emphasis on U.S. interests had a wholesome effect of stimulating the national prides of other Western nations in a way that made them more self-reliant and more reliable partners in the struggle against the common enemy.
Dulles is the man of 1954 because, in the decisive areas of international politics, he played the year's most effective role. He made mistakes, and he suffered heavy losses. But he was nimble in disentangling himself from his errors. The heaviest losses of 1954 were prepared by serious mistakes made years ago; Dulles limited the damage.
Regionally, 1954's greatest area of success for American diplomacy and the man who runs it was the Middle East. There, a number of old problems were solved by new approaches. Items:
¶ After decades of dispute, the status of the Suez Canal area was settled more firmly than ever before. On the surface, this was an affair between the British, who agreed to withdraw their troops, and Egypt's Man of the Year, Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser. In fact, the settlement was skillfully midwifed by the U.S. State Department through Old Diplomat Jefferson Caffery, then Ambassador to Egypt.
¶ After three years of shutdown and stalemate at Abadan (caused by the stubborn egotism of 1951's Man of the Year, Mohammed Mossadegh), Iran agreed to let foreign firms (chiefly British) resume operating the Iranian oil industry, which the Iranians were incapable of operating.
