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Unofficially invited to London last fortnight to feel out the atmosphere, Nikos Kranidiotis, secretary of the Ethnarchy Council (the governing body of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus) and right-hand man of Makarios, said: "There may be a better chance here than in the fever of Cyprus." The British, he felt, might now be ready to agree to a Greek majority among elected members of the legislature. In return, the Archbishop would probably compromise on the width and tenure of the security measures to be had by the British, might come to terms over the release of prisoners, and might no longer insist on a time limit for self-determination. If agreement could be reached on these points, Archbishop Makarios would immediately appeal to the terrorists to call off the violence—and, said Kranidiotis, he would be obeyed. Asked why the peace-loving Archbishop had not done this earlier, Kranidiotis explained that, as the elected representative of the Cypriot people, the Archbishop had been bound to heed their inclinations, which were in "the Greek heroic tradition."
The Turkish Snag. Although this view seemed to confirm the British charge that the Archbishop was intimately connected with Cypriot terrorist activity, and despite misgivings about the Archbishop's reasons for not demanding a definite date for self-determination (thus giving him the opportunity to raise the issue whenever he wished), the British were in a mood to go ahead with a new offer to the Cypriots. There remained one more snag—Turkey.
The Turks welcome British control of Cyprus because the base also protects Turkey, and because they, as co-partners in the Baghdad Pact, see eye to eye with British policy in the Middle East. They have said that they will not tolerate control of Cyprus by Greece, a country which they fear might, at some change of government, easily become neutralist. Cyprus is only 40 miles from the Turkish mainland, and governs the southern approaches to that country. A neutralist Cyprus would compel the Turks to reorient their whole defense.
A tripod of interests must be satisfied. A guaranteed continuance of the British military base, on an island free in time to determine its own political future—would that satisfy Turk, Greek and Briton? Last week the British announced that General Sir Gerald Templer, chief of the Imperial General Staff, would shortly confer with Turkish Premier Menderes. Everybody at least seemed to be trying.