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of 1953-The Administration has offered all sorts of explanations for its go-slow mobilization. Following the doctrine laid down by George Marshall, planners base their compromise on the unpredictable reality of a cold war, which might hot up at any moment, or simmer for ten years. They argue first that they do not want to disrupt the civilian economy (the military used to state its needs bluntly, leave to somebody else the onus of ruling that the nation couldn't afford it). George Marshall likes to say that the U.S. cannot mobilize too fast, or it will be "all dressed up with no place to go." Another pet Pentagon phrase capsules a planner's fear: that once production is really turned on, "the damned stuff will be running out of our ears." Even more basic to military men is the fear of overproducing the obsolete: if the U.S. has all the planes it needs to fight in 1953, but does not get into war until 1958, it will need just about an entire new air force. If the planners' optimism is justified, and the U.S. is not in World War III by 1953; the nation's taxpayers will be grateful for such economy; if the planners are wrong, the U.S. will be disastrously half-ready. It is a massive gamble, which only a few men like Elder Statesman Bernard Baruch boldly criticize: he, almost alone, would go all-out on production now; the rest mutter and have misgivings, but go along.
Whether or not the gamble works, the U.S. cannot afford to be 20% behind in half-speed mobilization.