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The national agoraphobia after World War I and Franklin Roosevelt's effort to buy a way out of World War II with Lend-Lease were only zigzags in the broad U.S. policy. F.D.R. understood that when, before Pearl Harbor, he told Congress: "Our most useful and immediate role is to act as an arsenal."
Some observers described Harry Truman's new policy as another Lend-Lease. It was far more than that. It was a projection of the advice which George Marshall gave the nation at the end of World War II. He spoke then as Chief of Staff, and in military terms: "The only effective defense a nation can now maintain is the power of attack." Other military leaders paraphrased it: "U.S. policy is now to wage the peace around the world."
In assessing Harry Truman's policy it was necessary to consider this fact: George Marshall, as Secretary of State, had drafted three quarters of the speech.
Background of Policy. Marshall was studying the German problem when the message came that Britain would be obliged to withdraw her support of Greece after March 31. He abandoned the German problem forthwith and turned his attention to the Mediterranean. He conferred for many anxious hours with Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson and General of the Army Dwight Eisenhower.
The decision they reached was largely a military, not a diplomatic one. Marshall took the decision to Harry Truman, who agreed with it and laid it before congressional leaders on Feb. 27. On the day Marshall left for Moscow, Clark Clifford, Truman's adviser and ghostwriter, began editing Marshall, Acheson and Eisenhower into shape. Clifford's draft was sent to Marshall, who made only a few revisions. That was the background of the statement. (Thus Henry Wallace's angry charge over the radio that Harry Truman had undermined his Secretary of State's assignment was obviously incorrect.)
No Other Choice? This week, as U.S.
Ambassador to Greece Lincoln MacVeagh headed home to report, Washington was in the midst of bitter debate. Harry Truman would need Marshall's considerable prestige to balance the practical and emotional arguments against his course. Questions came from left & right.
From the high grass in left field, Henry Wallace demanded: -"How can we wage a war of nerves against Russia and expect her to take in good faith our proposals to the United Nations on atomic energy?" Considering Gromyko's recent denunciation of U.S. proposals, the question scarcely seemed relevant.
But some of the questions did require an answer. Wasn't there danger that such "independent movements" would destroy U.N.? Was it politically wise to support the government of Greece, which was hardly a model of democracy? Wouldn't this program lead to the same kind of imperialism which Great Britain had followed so long and which Americans had so sternly criticized in the past?
Said Senator Robert Taft: "We can hardly longer reasonably object to the Russians continuing their domination in Poland, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Rumania. The loans, therefore, accept the policy of dividing the world into zones of political influence. Perhaps," the Senator added, "there is no other course."