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But Admirals Helfrich and Furstner, by then the dominant figures of The Netherlands Navy, were already at work on war plans and naval expansion. Their plan was offensive: continuous reconnaissance, hard and rapid stabs at the Jap, as far away from the Indies as possible. Their new Navy was geared to this plan. When war came they had five light cruisers, eight destroyers, 20 submarines and about 30 torpedo boats, designed for maneuver in the narrow Indies waters. They also had a small but growing naval air force.
Alone, these forces would be no match for the Japanese, and Conrad Helfrich knew it. To cut up Japan's sea lines before they could be knitted right around the Indies, he counted on: 1) maximum support from the U.S. and British Pacific fleets; 2) the effectiveness of his own hit-&-run offensive.
Son of War. For Conrad Helfrich, the war with Japan really began last July. When the Japanese sent warships into the Gulf of Siam and the South China Sea, he saw that they were after bases in Siam and Indo-China, and he begged his Government to let him attack forthwith. The Indies Government was more than half-willing, but after consultations with Washington and London the answer to Admiral Helfrich was: "No." He took his orders, but grumbled a warning: "If we give them time to prepare bases in Siam, they will be ready to attack Singapore in half a year."
When the Japanese attacked in December, prescient Admiral Helfrich flung up his arms and exclaimed: "There you have it! We could have sunk their transports." His fleet was already at sea, and 24 hours after the first Jap attacks, his submarines sank four enemy transports off Malaya. His Navy's bag in the first 54 days of war: 54 Jap ships.
When the U.S. Navy's Admiral Hart brought his Asiatic Fleet of cruisers, destroyers and submarines from the Philippines into Conrad Helfrich's home waters, Admiral Helfrich yielded the Allied naval command to his senior. Under Admiral Hart, the little Dutch Fleet joined the little U.S. Fleet. Along with others in the Dutch high command, Conrad Helfrich grimly set himself to a bitter task: to convince Washington and London that Java could be held, that the chance was worth the maximum risk of ships and planes.
The Indies got a few, then a few more Flying Fortresses and fighters, in command of the U.S. Army's Major General Lewis Hyde Brereton; no more of the heavy cruisers Conrad Helfrich desperately wanted, no more destroyers than Vice Admiral William A. Glassford Jr., the U.S. Fleet's battle commander, had brought from the Philippines. They were perhaps all that the U.S. could get there in time, but they were not enough.
Helfrich's way of holding, until all-out aid arrived, was to attack and attack and attack, hitting the Japs before they were fairly launched into the outer Indies. This offensive strategy involved great risks and probably grave losses. But, like many an admiring U.S. naval officer, Admiral Helfrich believed that the risks would be justified, that warships were built to be risked and perhaps lost. But higher orders kept the combined Dutch and U.S. Fleets from the offensive until the Japs were firmly based in the northern Celebes and upper Borneo, were on the way down the Strait of Macassar.