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After developing the Cripps offer you have said . . . "But I see no reason to release those responsible for the declaration of August 8, 1942 [The All India National Congress' demand that the British quit India at once], until I am convinced that the policy of noncooperation and even of obstruction has been with' drawn—not in sackcloth and ashes—that helps no one—but in recognition of a mistaken and unprofitable policy."
... I am surprised that you, an eminent soldier and man of affairs, should hold such an opinion. How can the withdrawal of a resolution arrived at jointly by hundreds of men and only after much debating and careful consideration, be a matter of individual conscience? The resolution, jointly undertaken, can be honourably, conscientiously and properly withdrawn only after joint discussion and deliberation. ... If you can but trust us, you will find us to be the greatest helpers in the fight against Naziism, Fascism and Japanism and the like. . . .
Wavell to Gandhi.
Dear Mr. Gandhi:
... I do not think it profitable that we should enter into a lengthy argument and do not propose to answer in detail the points you raise in your letter. . . .
The draft declaration of His Majesty's Government which Sir Stafford Cripps brought to India stated in unmistakable terms the intention of H.M.G. to give India self-government under a constitution of her own devising arrived at by an agreement between the principal elements.
I need hardly say that I am in entire accord with that aim and only seek the best means to implement it without delivering India to confusion and turmoil. . .
At the greatest crisis of all for India, at the time when a Japanese invasion was possible, the Congress party decided to pass a resolution calling on the British to leave India, which could not fail to have a most serious effect on our ability to defend the frontiers of India against the Japanese. . . .
I do not accuse you or the Congress party of any wish deliberately to aid the Japanese. But you are too intelligent a man, Mr. Gandhi, not to have realized that the effect of your resolution must be to hamper the prosecution of the war; and it is clear to me that you had lost confidence in our ability to defend India and were prepared to take advantage of our supposed military straits to. gain a political advantage. I do not see how those responsible for the safety of India could have acted otherwise than they did and could have failed to arrest those who sponsored the resolution. As to the general Congress responsibility for the disturbances which followed, I was, as you know, Commander in Chief at the time; my vital lines of communication to the Burma frontier were cut by Congress supporters, in the name of Congress, often using the Congress flag. I cannot, therefore, hold the Congress party guiltless of what occurred; and I cannot believe that you with all your acumen and experience could have been unaware of what was likely to follow from your policy. I do not believe that the Congress party's action in this matter represented the real feeling of India nor that the Congress attitude of noncooperation represents the opinion of anything like the majority of India. . . .
Gandhi to Wavell.
Dear Friend:
. . . You have sent me a frank reply.