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Few American and British correspondents and few visiting big shots have been allowed glimpses of anything but small segments of the great battlefield—and then mostly after the battle has passed. Few Allied military observers—British or American—have been allowed to visit the front to study the Russian Army in action. Joseph Stalin, calling for arms and food, calling repeatedly for a second front, is still playing his cards very close to his blouse.
But from geography, from time and from the behavior of the enemy army, the Allies have been able to deduce certain hard facts. The world knows what the Germans took and how long they took to take it. The world has seen the German attacks decrease in scope and effect, has seen the Russians come back with ever-increasing power and effect.
German Weakness or Russian Strength? These facts tell the story of German losses, of German exhaustion. They also are convincing evidence that the Russians have progressively mastered the art of modern war, the new use of new weapons like massed tanks, the new use of old weapons like cavalry. There are still questions unanswered.
How much has the German decline been due to the fact that Hitler took on too big a job for Germany? How much of the German decline is due to the fact that Germany was not equipped to fight a long war and has been forced to live upon her military capital since the failure to win a decision in 1941? How much of the German decline has been due to the fact that the Russians have learned to outsmart and outfight them?
The next few weeks may partially answer these questions.
Russia's war is not yet won. As Germany exhausted herself trying to carry the war to Russia on a 1,500-mile battle line, Russia, in spite of her greater manpower, may also lose it by the same means unless the battle wisdom of the Russian Army is great enough to prevent it.
The German decline is at least partly due to the fact that the offensive which they held for so long proved relatively more costly to them than to the Russian defenders. Russian victory now hangs on the ability of Russia's generals to make the defensive also relatively more costly to the Germans than to the Russian attackers.
The Leaders. The battle wisdom on which this now depends must come from the heads of Russia's leaders. Part of it must come from the Soviet Supreme Command (Marshals Stalin, Shaposhnikov, Zhukov, Voroshilov, Vasilevsky, Voronov, Novikov). Part of it must come from the leaders who have actually wrought Russia's victories in the field.
Outstanding among these are the historic three who fought through Stalingrad's siege and counteroffensive—Colonel General Markian Mikhailovich Popov, Army General Nicolai Fedorovich Vatutin and Army General Konstantin Rokossovsky. They, along with Colonel General Vassily Sokolovsky and Colonel General Ivan Konev, were the men chosen to command the hydra-headed counterattack on Orel and Belgorod last month. They broke the short-lived German summer offensive of 1943 and developed the battle into a Russian onslaught.
They are the leaders (along with others, unknown outside of Russia) who are the driving forces of Stalin's Red Army.