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In many respects of detail, Munich was milder than Godesberg. On the question of time, which was actually the point on which war nearly broke out last week, Hitler had demanded 12,000 square miles by October 1. He got 300 square miles on October 1 (see p. 18) and is to get a total of 10,000 square miles progressively by October 10. Moreover, plebiscites will now be held under an international commission of five set up by the Big Four, consisting of one Czech, one Briton, one Frenchman, one German and one Italianthus weighted 3 to 2 on the side of the democracies. Neutral observers predicted: "The Czechs now have a good chance to win most of the plebiscites," which are to be held by November 30. The Commission of Five is empowered to recommend "minor modifications in strictly ethnographical determination of the zones which are to be transferred without plebiscite." An annex to the pact of the Big Four decreed that Britain and France immediately join in "an international guarantee of the new boundaries of the Czechoslovak State against unprovoked aggression." This was an historic reversal of British policy, for up to now Britain has not been directly pledged to anything on the Continent, except via her League obligations. This pledge binds her in black and white to Czechoslovakia even more definitely than her unwritten entente binds her to France.
The Big Four, instead of settling the Polish and Hungarian minority questions in Czechoslovakia at Munich, left these open for 90 days pending action by the three little countries themselves (see p. 18), and only later if necessary will the Big Four settle that hash. The Munich pact concludes: "When the question of the Polish and Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia has been settled, Germany and Italy, for their part, will give a guarantee to Czechoslovakia."
Significance. The triumph of Germany was enormous, but not without limits, which were set as firmly as limits can be set in the Europe of 1938. If the crisis proved anything with finality, it proved that modern communication and enlightenment of the peoples reduce the chances of an outbreak of war. For the first time in history, a major conflict had been settled by talking instead of shooting first. And, while all men of good will deplored the dismemberment of central Europe's one island of democracy and were saddened for the painful uprooting of the minorities which will leave the ceded territories, realists took heart from one fact. Unlike the rapes of Manchukuo and Ethiopia, the Czechoslovak rape had at least set a precedent, which might flower into a great influence for peace, for aggressors being persuaded to follow legal-diplomatic forms.
