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President Roosevelt has been cogitating that question. As a result the U. S. Delegation is fitted out with an elaborate sop to be offered at the right moment to Japan, a positively devilish sop in the opinion of Japanese sea dogs who hoped and prayed last week that it will not water down their human torpedo into a damp squib.
As explained in Washington, the sop would be to set up in place of "naval ratios" something called "security equality."
The Big Three, under this scheme, would each have "100% security," this percentage being made up on the basis of geography and armaments. By reason of her geographical remoteness, Japan would be considered to start with some "30% security" and would make up the remaining "70% of security" in armaments. The U. S. and Britain, on the other hand, would be considered to start with a geographical security of zero. Thus the "100% security" of the U. S. and Britain would be all armaments.
This brand of "security equality" President Roosevelt is apparently willing to grant Japan. In actual negotiation enough complexities could perhaps be introduced to save Japan's face and conceal the essential nature of the offer: a ratio of 10-10-7. This would mean a distinct promotion for Japan from the present ratio of 10-10-6.
When correspondents asked Admiral Yamamoto whether Japan would demand straight ton-for-ton equality with the U. S. and Britain, he replied: "The relationship of the Japanese Navy to those of the two other powers concerned is no different from the relationship between the navies of Great Britain and the United States. Under the existing treaties, the American and British navies enjoy parity respecting all categories, but neither is satisfied. I believe that illustrates the fundamental weakness of a system of disarmament, or arms, based on ratios. Japan wants equality!"
Japan will obviously try to fish in the troubled waters of U. S.-British naval disagreement. Last week this disagreement remained exactly what it has been ever since the Coolidge Naval Conference at Geneva (TIME, Aug. 15, 1927 et ante). Inside the global tonnage in which the U. S. and Britain are amicably equal they are angrily desirous of building somewhat different kinds of ships. The U. S., poorly equipped with naval bases, needs war boats of comparatively large tonnage and consequent long cruising range. Britain, well equipped with bases from which to refuel her fleets, would like to build smaller war boats, thus enabling her to pack a greater number of fighting units inside her global tonnage. This the U. S. cannot permit, fearful of a British swarm of hornet ships. Britain in turn fears what the U. S. might achieve with a sudden thrust of mammoth ships in a great battle such as Jutland.
Last week the British Admiralty was urging Prime Minister MacDonald to demand a new agreement whereby Britain could have 70 cruisers, each somewhat smaller than those comprising the 50 to which she is limited by present treaties. Like Presidents Harding, Coolidge and Hoover, President Roosevelt was understood to stand firm last week on the basis of 35,000 tons as the proper size for each nation's capital ships, while Britain would like to cut this maximum to 25,000.