(5 of 8)
U.S. experts study Soviet equipment captured from Arab armies by the Israelis, but that is only conventional weaponry. For knowledge about Soviet nuclear missiles, the U.S. relies mainly on the pictures of Soviet missiles taken by intelligence satellites that course across Soviet skies and aerial reconnaissance shots of Soviet test firings that record the re-entry of Soviet warheads in the Pacific. But so far as is known, U.S. experts have never had the opportunity to run their hands over a Soviet nuclear warhead, or look inside. Nor, presumably, have U.S. cryptographers ever had the chance to examine the construction of a Soviet cipher machine or to read Soviet code books.
The sunken submarine offered those opportunities. The diesel-driven ship of the G or Golf class (vintage 1958-62) had long since been made obsolescent by the Soviet nuclear-powered submarines of the Yankee and Delta classes. Nonetheless, in the superstructure behind its tall conning tower, the submarine typically carried three nuclear-tipped missiles of the Serb class, which has a 650-mile range and a 500 kiloton warhead. At the time the SALT I negotiations were about to start, and an examination of the Serb warheads would have given U.S. experts an invaluable insight into the state of Soviet nuclear technology. They could have learned about the reliability, accuracy and method of triggering the nuclear matter of Soviet missiles. They could have compared their earlier evaluations based on satellite data against the real thing. Hence U.S. negotiators could have entered the SALT talks with the advantage of having a clearer understanding of Soviet nuclear strength.
Defense System. In 1968 the U.S. was building a widespread anti-missile defense system intended to intercept and destroy Soviet ICBMS before they struck American cities. A study of the guidance system and flight characteristics of the Soviet warhead would have enabled U.S. scientists to program more effectively the computers directing the U.S.'s targeting radar.
There were other incentives. The Navy had never examined a Soviet torpedo; the G-class subs carried at least ten in bow and aft tubes. U.S. naval experts also had never subjected the steel used in Soviet sub hulls to metallurgical analysis. Test results could tell them how deep Soviet subs can dive, a vital bit of information in undersea warfare.
The U.S. intelligence community has its own special enthusiasms. Aboard the sub were cipher machines and Soviet code manuals; provided they were stored in watertight safes, those manuals might still be legible. "It would be an absolutely unique, unprecedented opportunity to capture an entire Soviet code room," said a ranking U.S. intelligence expert. "We have never before had access to the Soviets' top-secret cryptographic equipment or to any individual who had worked inside one of their code rooms."